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ABSTRACT

Philosophical Foundations,
Social Power and Social
Work Practice
by
Timothy D. Hamilton
Dr. Satish Sharma. Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Social Work
University of Nevada. Las Vegas

The contemporary philosophical landscape, which affects the fields of
philosophical endeavor and the ways power is framed, is described. The covert
manner these influences effect social work practice is made more visible through the
use o f ethically oriented decision making patterns.
Ways that authority and discretion are used and abused, and abusive decision
making. are described making them easier to recognize and mitigate. Knowledge of
current and potential ways that social power operates provides social workers tools in
promoting the goals of empowerment and uncovering and enhancing clients' strengths.
Finally, a public sphere within which a reflective social work practice could
operate, using concepts generated by other members of a social science public,
addressing the interplay of power and ethics, is delineated.

Ill

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

iü

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vi

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
Philosophical Groundwork in Social Sciences
Modemity-Postmodemity Debate
Metaphysics
Epistemology
Ethics
Social Power
Authority and Discretion
Marginal Terms
Conceptualizing Social Power
15
Social W ork Practice
Social W ork in the Public Sphere
Social Work and Epistemology
Social Work and Social Power
The Adopted Perspectives
The Methodology

I
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14

CHAPTER n PHILOSOPHICAL GROLfNDWORK IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
Modemity/Postmodemity
Metaphysical. Epistemological. Ethical, and Social Power Issues
Philosophical Bases of Social Construction O f Knowledge
Metaphysics
W hat Questions are Viable
Post-Metaphysical Thinking
Epistemology
Building Blocks of Knowledge Construction
Building Blocks of Social Construction of Knowledge
Ethics

29
29
34
36
37
39
43
45
46
50
53

IV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
17
18
20
21
25

Ethics/Morality Distinctions
Modemity/Postmodemity and Ethics in Practice

55
58

CHAPTER m SOCIAL POWER
Authority, Discretion and Decision Making
Faces o f Authority
Faces o f Discretion
Margins/Marginalization
Deconstmction and Marginal Terms
Reifying Terms?
Conceptualizing Social Power
78
Social Power and Authority
Postmodem Power?

62
63
65
68
70
72
75

CHAPTER IV SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE
Social Work In the Public Sphere
Social W ork’s Communication Community
Sources of Social Work Knowledge
Social Work and Epistemology
Authority and Values in Social Work in Practice
Authority, Discretion. Privileging and Social Construction
Social Work and Social Power
Reflexive Practitioners
Whose Benefit? Evolving Moral Development

88
90
93
95
100
101
105
109
111
117

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

81
83

120

REFERENCES

125

VITA

149

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend a most heartfelt thanks to my thesis committee
chairman, advisor, and mentor Dr. Satish Sharma, for the hours of discussion about the
ideas expressed in this project.
I would like to extend my thanks also to the members of my thesis committee.
Dr. Dil, Dr. GlenMaye, and Dr. O ’Brien whose questions and comments have helped
me to more fully ground the ideas set forth in this thesis within the social work
perspective.
For my wife, Patty, who has helped me incessantly; when not directly, through
assuming other family tasks to provide me the time to work. This project would not
have been possible without her help.

VI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social power is abused in every conceivable sphere of activity within which
individual human beings take part. From the home to workplace, from small business
to corporate empire, from educational to religious settings, power is abused between
people. These abuses are not always blatant and visible; if they were they would be
much easier to identify and mitigate. Often theses abuses are covert; hidden in
presuppositions and patterns of tradition and socialization not generally open to
questioning. Religious systems, ethical systems and penal systems have been demised
to reduce the frequency of occurrence but still abuses occur. This project undertakes
to identify and clarify where and how these abuses occur in ways that effect social
work practice. It seeks to describe how even the ways communication occurs within
and between individuals and groups of individuals facilitates these abuses. The project
attempts to survey a wide enough scope to encompass a majority of the spheres of
activity social workers are concerned with while limiting the scope to social work
practice. It proposes a framework of self-reflexivity from which to approach these
arenas. This investigation begins with the basic groundwork of any profession; it's
knowledge base.
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Knowledge generation in social work, as in any other social science discipline,
has a “philosophical groundwork”. This groundwork is usually implicit; buried in the
philosophical assumptions of the authors’ works used to generate social work/ social
science knowledge. In order to more adequately understand social science’s current
philosophical foundations, the general groundwork o f contemporary philosophy must
be familiar to the researcher. This general groundwork includes the three “pillars” o f
philosophy; epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, and the contemporary arguments
that buffet these fields o f endeavor. These arguments are set in yet another underlying
groundwork which is the modemity/postmodemity debate. Within this groundwork,
social influences operate to effect how this groundwork is perceived, or not perceived,
as structuring concerns which derive from the philosophical issues the groundwork
itself reflects. These influences operate in primarily indirect ways through sometimes
indiscernible middle-grounds or marginal spaces. More directly, these influences
operate through discretionary decision making within the fields of endeavor social work
draws upon for information from which to make it’s own decisions.
These academic fields are those areas of the “communication community”
within the “public sphere” that are drawn on by social work, as a discipline, and used
for its construction of research and practice wisdom and application to the fields o f
service social work approaches. The social construction o f meaning-systems partakes
o f many influences. Social construction of meaning is not unfamiliar to anyone; power
relations are not unfamiliar to anyone; “reflexive practice,” that activity that social
workers will be called upon to be more attendant to, is not unfamiliar to anyone. Even
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the modernity / postmodemity debate is not new to the field of social work. What may
be a potentially new consideration is that social workers could attend more closely to
what power/ethical currents are embedded in the sources o f information taken as
authorities (in the issues considered as relevant to social work practice) as well as
attending to what has been set aside in favor of power considerations in the generation
o f information utilized to generate practice information.
Power and ethics are almost interdependent terms. The power issues that occur
in all o f our everyday interactions from interpersonal relationships, employment in
agencies, to public government, though on different scales, are expressed through
similar dynamic structures. Where do power and ethics begin to effects the tenets of
each o f the academic disciplines that social work draws on to do it’s work? Where is
the middle ground (the margin) where power meets ethics; where do they interface?
This middle ground is important to talk about; to make visible through bringing
it into focus in the public sphere. What operates within this middle ground; this
“marginal” area, that delineates what becomes even admitted to the public sphere for
consideration as knowledge? What operates within this marginal territory that allows
power to hold sway here and ethics to hold sway there? What operates in this margin
to marginalize some voices and to privilege others? Within the field that is the social
work “communication community” in the public sphere, what determines what is
acceptable as Knowledge? Currently it is what is privileged by those who perpetuate
the current paradigm o f “scientific” procedure as knowledge. The questions being
asked are about how the scientific, or any other, methodology was privileged over
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some other mode of approach to knowledge development. This is not about the debate
between positivism and it’s opponents, nor about the debate between externally
replicable knowledge and introspection; it’s about the process that occurs when one
side o f any dichotomy, or one option among a range o f choices for that matter, gets
chosen over the other. It is about what is used as and called knowledge when
information is sought after for policy decision making, research, and practice materials.
Finally this paper asks of individual social workers what ranges o f
considerations are looked at when choosing materials to use in generating practice
research. Whose information is privileged in the moment o f the decision about which
knowledge to use and act on as information. How does any individual voice attempt to
be recognized by the public sphere? Is it by utilizing (as is tradition) those materials
whose author’s “names” have been privileged; regardless o f the positions they have
philosophically in terms o f their power usage?
Thus, the main foci o f this project will include the following. Outlining some of
the major themes that surface in the contemporary currents of what is being called the
modemity/postmodemity debate will set the basic groundwork. Some o f the ways this
debate effects the issues under exploration here, metaphysics, ethics, epistemology and
social power, are clarified. Then each major “pillar” of philosophical influence,
metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, is explored in terms of how each contributes to
the construction o f social work practice wisdom. Through this process the currents of
modernist/postmodernist themes are highlighted.
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After outlining themes o f philosophy applicable to a social work perspective,
the focus moves to an exploration of the ways in which knowledge is generated or
constructed. The different views about what has been, and what currently is, seen as
knowledge construction are delineated as well as how even these views are effected by
modem / postmodem thinking. How the final pillar o f philosophy, ethics, is influenced
by the modem/postmodem currents and how these currents affect social work issues is
clarified.
At this point, the project shifts focus to delineate some o f the frameworks
through which power has been described in recent literature. In addition, the theme o f
social power is critically “deconstructed” to make visible it’s workings within and
behind the scheme o f things. The media, authority, and activities, discretion and
decision making, are also here critically deconstructed in order to make more clear for
social workers how these workings function and some o f the milieu within which these
workings can be expected to be present. Then, the spaces within which social power
operates and the “systematicity” that allows such pervasive activity are explored. Here
the means o f exploration, deconstruction, is also clarified. Having described some o f
the workings o f social power, current conceptualizations o f social power are more
easily understandable. Though not the paper’s focus, following current
conceptualizations, alternatives are offered.
Finally, the themes highlighted in previous section are brought to bear on social
work practice. The areas o f the public sphere that social work practice occurs within,
and is expected to have the most effect in, is described with regard to how activities are
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affected by the philosophical and power themes mentioned above. As a member among
other members within this public sphere, social work’s communication community
characteristics are outlined. Then, themes with which other members o f the public
sphere are concerned, themes of importance to social work, are outlined. This outline
attempts to take into consideration how the philosophical and power issues described
above affect these themes. Then a reflective practitioner framework o f approach
focused on ethical answers to power abuses is presented as a potential strategy to apply
to effect the goal o f reflective practitioners engaged in balancing power abuses in social
work research and practice.

Philosophical Groundwork in Social Sciences
In this section the major themes involved in the Modemity/Postmodemity
debate as well as those addressed within the fields o f metaphysics, epistemology and
ethics will be outlined briefly. Here only the contours of the modemity-postmodemity
debate will be drawn. Characterizations, first o f modernity and then o f postmodemity,
will outline the intellectual space each current animates. Then variations on the
differentiation within these two frames o f reference will be delineated. Finally the
general themes that are the focus of the debate will be outlined briefly. The sections
below will select from the extant literature specific areas of modemity/postmodemity
debate which will be most pertinent to a social worker’s focus as s/he utilizes issues of
a philosophical groundwork engaging in a practice that would seek to balance power.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Modemity/Postmodemity Debate
The Modernity/Postmodemity debates in philosophy affect the dialogues going
on about the questions regarding philosophical themes in the academic disciplines
making up the three basic elements of philosophy (Habermas, 1997; p.39);
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (Honderich, 1995). These three elements are all
concerned with rational thinking about “the general nature o f the world (metaphysics),
justification o f belief (epistemology or theory o f knowledge), and the conduct of life
(ethics or theory o f value) (Honderich, 1995; p. 666). The debate is centrally focused
on two issues o f utmost interest to social work research and practice; power and
limitations o f power (Kondrat, 1995; Laird, 1995; Pardeck, Murphy & Choi 1994;
Pozatek, 1994).
The discussion is initiated by outlining the specific issues within this debate
relevant to social work concerns. What is known as dialouge or research in
modernity’s perspective is, in postmodemity, now “discourse.” Rosenau (1992)
defines “discourse” as “all that is written or spoken that invites dialogue or
conversation” (p.xi). Discourses, which can be modem or postmodern, act to go past
the activity o f dialogue in that they also take part in the activity o f “social constmction”
o f the reality they delineate (Humphries, 1997; p.644). “Social construction,” another
important issue in the debate is defined by Kenneth Gergen ( 1985) as
principally concemed with explicating the processes by which people come to
describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in
which they live. It attempts to articulate common forms o f understanding as
they now exist, as they have existed in prior historical periods, and as they
might existshould creative attention become so directed, (p.266)
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The social construction issue will be treated more completely below. What is
important about the social construction issue at this time is the idea in the
modemity/postmodemity debate that dialogues o f modernity are said to have expressed
structural power abuses based on objectivity ofinformation(Fraser & Nicholson, 1990;
Giroux, 1991; Humphries, 1997; Wilson, 1997) and discourses o f postmodemity
challenge these dialogues (Rosenau, 1992; Best & Kellner, 1991) partly through the
social construction perspective.

Metaphysics
Metaphysics has been defined as “speculations on the nature of being, truth, and
knowledge” (Fowler & Fowler, 1949). It concems itself with the nature o f ultimate
reality, what is there, what things exist, and how it is that this could be the case
(Grayling, 1995). Categories of concem include monism/pluralism, ontology, identity,
causation, space and time, and appearance and reality (Honderich, 1995).
Contemporary problems are approached through a “trillema whose terms are illusion,
well founded appearance, and fundamental reality” (Honderich, 1995; p.559). These
problems include questions o f ( 1) minds and mental phenomena and are concemed with
the foundations, primacy and location of the origins o f experiential reality; (2) values
and “the normative” and look to the significance o f how these frameworks are applied
to elements o f cognitive and physical experience; and (3) free will and to what extent
the concepts o f “freedom” and “free will” apply within a context where physical laws
have some sort o f ultimate influence over our actions or decisions (Honderich, 1995).
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These issues give rise to debates in areas such as “universals” in the distinctions
between identity and predication, “substance” in the sense o f distinguishing what is a
substance from what is perceived and “causation” in issues such as what aspects of
reality have external causes and what can be controlled by one’s efforts (Grayling,
1995).

Epistemology
Epistemology has been defined as “a branch o f philosophy which investigates
the origins, structure, methods and validity o f knowledge” (Runes, 1960; p.94). This
project will be narrowed to that topic matter which concems the social services
communication community. We must scan, briefly, a tapestry o f the field. The weft is
woven o f the ideas about knowledge generated by philosophers from Plato to the
present worked into the warp o f intemal and extemai reality as experienced by these
philosophers and their contemporaries.
Plato’s project was oriented toward shifting the focus o f his contemporaries,
the elite o f Greece, away from the senses toward refinement o f the intellect. Descartes
tried to exercise this intellect to differentiate the vague inner representations form those
which were more distinct. Locke shifted the focus away from the inner representations
toward the objects of sense whose appearances could also be taken as presentations of
knowledge. Hume looked to the “impressions” these presentations made to derive
knowledge which compelled one’s interest. Kant took clarified, distinct ideas and
joined them with the compelling impressions by “synthesis” through a system o f rules
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which were set up by the mind itself. “Before Kant, an inquiry into "the nature and
origin o f knowledge" had been a search for privileged inner representations" (Rorty,
1979; p. 158-161). In twentieth century philosophy, the “Anglo-Saxon” tradition
dating to Russell focused on logic and separated epistemology from psychology to
focus on propositions. The “Germanic” tradition moved toward a “defense o f freedom
and spirituality” (Rorty, 1979). The logical-positivist tradition that social work
currently grounds itself in was viewed by contemporaries of Comte as more o f a
philosophy o f science (Reamer, 1993).

Ethics
Ethics has been defined as “that study or discipline which concems itself with
judgments o f approval or disapproval, judgments as to the rightness or wrongness,
goodness or badness, virtue or vice, desirability or wisdom of actions, dispositions,
ends, objects, o f states of affairs” (Runes, 1960; p.98). It can be subdivided into a
number o f frames of reference. Greek ethics, began with the Sophists and continued
through Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s ethical works. Christian ethics is tied to a
religious reality. Ethical Naturalism looks to nature as a template, dissociated from any
religious view, for how to relate to other humans and to one’s own emotions.
Utilitarianism would look to a sort o f mathematical calculation of happinesses minus
sadnesses for the greatest number o f individuals. Kantian and Post-Kantian ethics
maintained that it was one’s duty to do what was right for it’s own sake in adherence
to a universally recognized “categorical imperative.” Twentieth-Century ethics, which
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Il
is more analytical than other approaches in it’s exploration of the “good,” “virtue,” and
what is currently construed as “valuable” (Honderich, 1995). It concems itself with the
values decided upon as motivating thought and action in the present and future for
individuals. The ethical is differentiated from the moral in terms o f ethicists differences
over which is more broad in scope or more focused on rules and/or obligations on
actions (Bauman, 1993; Grayling, 1995; Williams, 1995).
The debate between modernity and postmodemity effects how the themes
current within each o f the above academic fields are expressed. It has been necessary
to set forth an historical groundwork o f the three pillars of philosophy in order to
portray the scope o f each o f these fields. It is also intended as an overview, for a social
worker generating practice information, of some o f the areas within each o f these fields
where potential discretional misuses could occur. What may have been previously
accepted as “traditional” perspectives are now brought into question in terms o f power
abuses occurring.

Social Power
Just as it has been necessary to set forth the groundwork o f philosophy above
to clarify possible locations o f potential abuses, here it is necessary to set forth some of
the basic aspects o f “social power” we will be concemed with below. Power is
understood in a number o f ways and the specific dimensions to be explored will be
outlined to separate them fi-om dimensions not o f concem. Social workers will be
faced with direct abuses o f social power with clients, co-workers and with
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representatives o f employer auspices. Immediately, in differentiating social power from
power in general, the discussion of the concept of power, as it affects at least two
individuals, becomes necessary. Power can be said to operate within at least three
human interactive contexts; “practical, moral and evaluative” (Morriss. 1987). The
“practical” context concems things like recognizing that a bus going 50 mph has the
power to take the life o f a pedestrian. The “moral” context concems, among other
things, having the wherewithal to affect some kind o f change and failing to act to do so
resulting in a detrimental state o f affairs occurring, or acting to effect some detrimental
state. The “evaluative” context concems not an individual responsibility but a “set o f
social arrangements” (Morriss, 1987; p.40). Here concem will primarily be focused on
the “moral” context, secondarily with the “evaluative” context and not at all with the
“practical” context. Following is a look at how authority and discretion have the
potential to be used or abused (Handler, 1991) and how these potentialities could be
addressed.

Authority and Discretion
Social work hasn’t concemed itself much with the specific concepts o f authority
or discretion in the recent past. This is exemplified in the absence of the two topics
from the current edition o f the Encyclopedia o f Social W ork The Social Work
Dictionary also contains similar lacunae. “Authority” is defined in three words:
“expertise or power” (Barker, 1995). “Power” is defined simply as “the possession of
resources that enables individuals to do something independently or to exercise
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influence and control over others” (Barker, 1995). Discretion is not defined. These
lacunae seem unusual given the recent focus on empowerment (Pinderhughes, 1983) in
the social work literature o f the last decades.
Authority and discretion are interactive concepts and operate in the spaces
between rules or norms in many facets of social work practice. The role o f authority
that operates to privilege (Furr, 1995) in some cases and to marginalize (Mohan, 1996)
in others will be investigated. For instance, governmental policy-making involves the
use of power through the authority invested in it to make decisions based on the
available information at the time the decision was required and on sanction by the
voting population (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). Similarly the social worker who
would carry out policy in decisions made in the moment in interventions with clients
exercises discretionary power (March, 1987). Tropman & Erlich, (1987) describe
three modes of approach to use o f discretion in an authority position as force,
inducement, or value consensus. Force is generally seen to generate resentment and
has been identified as a “conflict strategy”. Inducement occupies a middle ground
between value consensus and force and requires the ability to manipulate the goods
used to induce. Value consensus frequently occurs through agreement about a course
o f action based on some sort o f socialization (Tropman & Erlich, 1987; p.265). The
process o f “investment” with authority requires that there be an investing entity who
“holds” the power it invests. This holding conveys value on the holder The investee
then becomes the mediator for the expression o f social power to it’s object. As
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mediator, the social actor takes on some characteristics o f a marginal quality. This
leads to a discussion o f marginal terms.

Marginal Terms
A discussion about “marginal terms” is necessary because social power
frequently operates in the margins between prescribed rules and those who are
obligated to constrain themselves by those rules (Hawkins, 1992). Before exploring
this idea, a look at what constitutes a “margin” and the ways in which this term will be
used here will be required. A description taken from Jacques Derrida ( 1982) will serve
to outline the intellectual space requiring recognition. The “margin,” for Derrida, is the
place at which the limit is drawn between two texts, it is that which constrains one
discourse from becoming another, that which limits one thing from becoming that in
relation to which it is defined (Derrida, 1982). Next, the use of the term “boundaries”
(Barker, 1995) in social work applications, and how it functions there in a way similar
to the Derridean concept, is discussed. Then the process through which a person might
become “marginal” (Marger, 1997) or “marginalized” (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha, &
West, 1990) will be explored. Most importantly, it must be remembered that “power”
operates within these marginal spaces. Marginalization, for the individual who has
become a “marginal man” [sic], is to be “living within one culture while belonging to
another culture; and being tom by the demands that this state of affairs puts upon him”
(Marger, 1997; p. 114).
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The concept of the boundaries in social work is similar in nature to that of the
margin. It is defined as “the regions separating two psychological or social systems.
Analogous to the membranes of living cells [functioning] to differentiate systems and to
permit the development of identity.... " (Barker, 1995; p.40). As with the marginal
man, the culture or idea which has been marginalized (Tucker, 1990) has some aspect
o f it’s identity set aside by a “hidden center” Ferguson, 1990) o f social power or
privilege. Often, this marginalizing activity has been “authorized” by indirect (and
sometimes direct) consent from agents whose duty is to be an advocate for the very
population it marginalizes.

Conceptualizing Social Power
How is social power conceptualized? Is it action on actions of another
(Foucault, 1983)? Is it aligning oneself with an individual or collective known to be
effective in getting it’s wishes realized (Rae, 1988)? Is it only a matter o f the context
that it’s activity is situated in (Wartenberg, 1992)? Here some elements o f the general
understanding o f social power will be selected and applied to the specific contexts
social workers will be interested in. What is the relationship between social power and
authority? Power is usually spoken o f within the context o f political activity (Raz,
1990; Wartenberg, 1992) but it is being recognized more frequently that the “personal
is political” (Van Den Burgh & Cooper, 1995) and that power affects interpersonal
relations in more than just the political realm (Wartenberg, 1992). Authority can be
said to enable one to exercise “power to require action” (Raz, 1990; p. 115). How does
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one act when one is “invested” with “authority”*’ One of the aspects o f this question is
that authority is a mediate term. This aspect will be treated in detail below. Another
aspect is that authority can be “legitimate” or “illegitimate”. If one’s power is
legitimate, how does one use this legitimacy (Lane, 1988)? Whose interests are in the
forefront when one claims authority to be obeyed in some state o f affairs (Wolff,
1990)7 How does one make good decisions when faced with situations like “ethical
dilemmas” (Reamer, 1990)7 How does one choose when one’s own interests vie with
those of the client; especially when there are “alternate possibilities” o f outcome one
sees given the different choices available (Frankfurt, 1988; p.6)7 The individual has the
responsibility to mediate how these questions will be answered through “gaining
knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes...” (Wolff 1990; p.25) in order
to make a good decision. How is this mediate aspect of the term “authority”
important?

Social Work Practice
Having presented the philosophical and social power groundwork through and
within which power abuses could occur, a look will be taken at how these affect social
work practice. In this section, three questions will be addressed; ( 1) what could an
enhanced focus on power and ethics interactions entail in social work research in the
public sphere and how could it be promulgated?; (2) how do the influences of
philosophical currents in contemporary society emerge in (a) the currents’ expressions
in the fields social work draws upon to build it’s research bases, and (b) the ideas social
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work research generates; and (3) how are these currents affected by forms o f power
and where are these forms o f power limited by ethical considerations in decisions made
by the individual practitioner? Also addressed will be the philosophical and social
power groundworks which come together in the activity o f social work practice
outlined below.

Social Work in the Public Sphere
Social work carries on it’s activity at all times through some form o f
communication in some form of public sphere (Edwards, 1995). It is necessary to set
down specific comportments to communicative action from Habermas ( 1984) and
Derrida (1981) in order to clearly establish (1) the kind o f activity which we will
propose within (2) the “public” space wherein this activity will take place. This public
space has been designated by Habermas (1989) as the “public sphere” and further
differentiated by what Karl-Otto Apel (1980) describes as the “communication
community.” The “public sphere” is a discursive space separate from the “private
domain” on one hand and the “public authority” on the other (Calhoun, 1992). It is
primarily a political field o f discourse among “private citizens” focused on the activity
o f the public authority and the value and validity o f this authority’s actions. This
discourse is taken up by an “unlimited communication community” which, through
intersubjective agreement about what constitutes the procedures argumentation will
take among themselves, mutually define the topics of immediate, critical interest (Apel,
1980). This relatively broad field of interest can be further narrowed and localized by
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Maarten Hajer’s (1993) concept of “discourse coalition” which “is basically a group o f
social actors who share a social construct” which “requires that the analysis go beyond
the investigations o f differences of opinion” to analysis of “social practices from which
social constructs emerge” (Hajer, 1993; p.45). For the purposes of this study, this
sphere o f communicative activity will be identified as consisting o f those consumers o f
the literature generated within the social services professions as well as that information
publicly discussed in a range o f academic and debate forums o f research and practical
application. The actors who would join in the communicative action o f this social work
“discourse coalition” would be those who look to implement an intensive focus on
reflective techniques which question the interaction o f social power, ethics and
epistemology as they apply to practical formulations o f “practice wisdom” (DeRoos,
1990) through a forum o f “rational-critical” discourse (Rosenau, 1992; p. 14). Social
workers acting in this public sphere utilize language incorporating philosophical and
power frameworks that are not always explicit in the course o f interactions. Making
these frameworks explicit through a general description of the public sphere and a
specific description o f social work’s public sphere will enhance the individual social
w orker’s ability to make decisions based on non-abusive criteria.

Social Work and Epistemology
“Decisionmakers seem to know, or at least sense, that most information is
tainted by the process by which it is generated” (March, 1987; p.295). How do social
workers avoid generating “tainted” information? The focus taken here will primarily be
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on how it is that we know what it is that we know. Given that rationality is, in a
number o f ways, “bounded” (March & Simons, 1958) understanding must be
developed about the processes of decision-making in everyday practice (DeRoos,
1990). Social workers must take more closely into consideration how the things taken
as knowledge are founded on presuppositions o f those individuals who generated that
knowledge. Do these presuppositions still obtain in current society; the society we
must think and act within? Perhaps these presuppositions are still valid...but what if
they are not?
Steven Such (1990) provides a framework within which the strand of
epistemology most associated with the focal point o f these concerns will be situated.
Stich delineates three “traditional” epistemological projects undertaken by
philosophers. The first project involves evaluation o f the methods o f reasoning used to
construct existing knowledge; how reason is used to arrive at the conclusions. The
second project is focused on determining what knowledge is; what states o f affairs can
be called knowledge. A third project concerns itself with answering those skeptics that
argue against the possibility that knowledge can be had.
This study limits itself to explorations o f the first of these projects; an
evaluation of methodologies of reasoning relative to social work practice. Three
different approaches to the methodology o f reasoning in the construction o f knowledge
will be examined These will correspond to the three “traditional” frames o f reference
that have been accepted as valid in knowledge construction; justification, truth, and
belief. The delineation and contribution o f each to the construction o f knowledge will
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be considered. The above outlined traditional structures o f knowledge construction
that have been the accepted paradigm in knowledge construction are open to questions
posed by the “social construction” perspective. It is necessary to delineate these
structures to find invisible tendencies to traditional privileging habitus. With these
invisible structures more clarified, discretionary decision making may be facilitated
taking into consideration utilizations o f social power.

Social Work and Social Power
Above a general circumscription o f idea of social power is outlined, but where
does social work’s “social power” derive from? As with other professional disciplines,
part o f it’s power lies in it’s ability to define what social work is as a profession (Leiby,
1978). What is not always so visible is the ways social work aligns itself with certain
“preference centers” (March, 1988). These preference centers can be political policy
making centers, academic discipline research inputs, or even client demands (Compton
& Galaway, 1979). That professionals be “self reflective” (Schon, 1983) applies even
more stringently to professional social workers (Rubin & Babbie, 1997, Sheafor,
Horesji & Horesji, 1994; Zastrow, 1995). This social worker self reflectiveness must
include an element o f ethical awareness (Gillespie, 1995; Reamer, 1990; 1993) that
makes provision for deciding closely about “the importance o f what we care about”
(Frankfurt, 1988; p.90) as individual social workers engaged in professional work in
the public sphere.
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Social science institutions, such as social work, base professional philosophies
on bodies o f knowledge generated by disciplines that legitimate their activity (Compton
& Galaway, 1979; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Reamer, 1993). The structures of
power and ethics built into the philosophies these source disciplines used then become
passed on through the language used to convey ideas (Bourdieu, 1991) into social
work research.
One o f the ways balancing “what we care about” as social workers against
invisible value structures can be accomplished is through social work practitioners
attending to the ways that their decisions can be affected by the philosophical bases the
research they use to make these decisions were based on (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991;
Reamer 1993) and in attending to the ways these ethical decisions affect everyday
practice. Knowing the layout o f the modemity/postmodemity debate can widen the
understanding o f the philosophical landscape to include the considerations prominent
within the social construction o f practice wisdom. To enhance a social workers ability
to make ethical decisions within situations social power may be a factor will promote
the balancing function o f these practice decisions.

The Adopted Perspectives
The critical approach o f the modemity/postmodemity debate encompasses
every field o f expression academic or aesthetic. It generally expresses it’s views in
forums utilizing philosophical terms. It offers meta-critical and meta-philosophical
views o f the contemporary landscape o f social thought and so must be considered in
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any project seeking to discover unchallenged presumptions about normative uses o f
social power. The influences that the three pillars o f philosophy outlined above,
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics are subjected to, are made explicit through the
rational-critical process o f exploration. In addition, academic fields, which are
themselves affected by the above influences, make up the framework of the social
sciences drawn upon by social workers.
Social work draws from a wide array o f disciplines in formulating it’s strategies
for providing service to populations of clientele. In the history o f the field, this service
provision has been o f a “cognitive” sort. Social workers from Mary Richmond to the
present have tried to “reason” with clientele in order to change some course of action
taken by clientele that was causing problems to those individuals. They have tried to
reason with community agents to provide for services where services were needed
(Leiby, 1988, Trattner, 1994). Reasoning processes were called into play on the part
of social workers in order to call the same processes into play in the “object
individuals” (Leiby, 1988). What guiding factors were in place for individual social
workers who had to deal with populations whose ranges o f experience were vastly
different from their own? The value systems in place in those early eras of social work
were products o f their contemporary social context (Reamer, 1995). They derived
from the values in place in disciplines drawn upon for practice strategies. These values
predominantly expressed the logical positivist perspective present in the formative years
of the social sciences (Habermas, 1993; Giddens & Turner, 1989).
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Cognitive science identifies a research framework (Von Eckardt, 1993) that
includes six fields of endeavor. These six fields, for the purposes o f this study, will be;
1) anthropology, 2) communications, 3) law, 4) politics, 5) psychology, and 6)
sociology. In this study, two o f the more mathematically oriented fields are exchanged
for tw o fields which more closely align with social work and from which social work is
more likely to draw in future activity. Each o f these disciplines approaches the
concepts o f power and ethics differently. Each of these disciplines have influence on
how individual social workers in the field formulate and discharge their activities as
social workers. Contemporary work in these fields will be reviewed focusing on how
these disciplines orient themselves to issues affecting social work practice. It is
necessary to categorize these disciplines into socially oriented, corresponding to the
macrosystemic, and personally oriented, or microsystemic, foci for our purposes.
Socially oriented influences structure how individuals orient perceptions o f interactions
between client and society. Personally oriented influences structure understanding o f
intrapersonal psychology and how individuals understand the psychologies o f other
minds.
There will not be a single answer to questions o f ethical power usage. What
must occur then is for a methodology or comportment toward power usage to integrate
the diversity o f perspectives, even as small as that represented in our sampling, to be
designated as feasible. This methodology must be amenable to a number of “plural”
(Rescher, 1993) interests to be addressed in such a way that communicative action
could occur (Habermas, 1984). The view here aims at being pragmatic; that is it must
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practically applicable (Honderich, 1995; p. 709) within the multilevel contexts o f social
work practice.
The perspectives utilized by this project include the view that the resource
framework that social work draws from is structured in a sort o f nested form. There
are a series o f “levels” o f critical perspectives that frame the discourse occurring in
academia that affect social workers efforts to generate practice wisdom. The first level
is that o f the critical activity in such areas as the modemity/postmodemity debate.
Research generation requires communicative activity(i.e. a forum, individual
participants, etc.) and therefore requires language which in turn requires reasoned
cognitive practices. Cognitive practices presuppose the ability to learn from new
information. The modemity/postmodemity debate has proponents and antagonist
within each o f the specific fields of the next level; the contemporary expressions of
research in the three pillars o f philosophy described above. Their views are expressed
in their theoretical formulations within their respective fields. These theoretical
underpinnings are not always made manifest in their stated assumptions. These fields
are then utilized by researchers in the next level, the six fields also described above in
making their field specific formulations. Finally, social workers utilize information
from these latter fields, whose knowledge generators do not always specify their
philosophical positions, to generate practice knowledge. The following will describe in
as concise a manner possible the specific presuppositions this project is based on.
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The Methodology
The framework for the methodology of this study derives from B. Von
Eckardt's (1993) What is Cognitive Science. This paper will follow her description o f
a “research framework” though within a narrower scope and different goal than what
she takes. Von Eckardt describes cognitive science as encompassing a number of
“disciplines” including philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience,
and computer science. For the purposes o f this project focus will be on a narrower
range o f this field o f human sciences, as outlined above, avoiding areas where
“determination” o r “causality” can be said to have clearly probable influence. After
outlining Von Eckardt’s framework, applications o f it’s specific attributes which will to
this project will be delineated. This research framework
consists o f four basic sets o f elements; a set o f assumptions that provide a pretheoretic specification o f the domain under study...; a set o f basic empirical
research questions, formulated pre-theoretically... ; a set o f substantive
assumptions that embody the approach being taken in answering the basic
questions...; and a set o f methodological questions.... (Eckardt, 1993; p. 18)
Within the set o f elements designated as “domain specifying assumptions” are included
an “identification” assumption, “property” assumptions, and “grouping” assumptions.
The “basic questions” will focus inquiry more narrowly the intent o f the project. The
“substantive assumptions” will be oriented to the content within each “discipline” that
will be presented. The “methodological assumptions” further delineate the types o f
answers that will be valid to the intent o f the project.
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The domain assumptions are as follows:
1. There are spheres o f activity o f a cognitive sort (i.e., academic disciplines,
communication communities) wherein systems o f interactive influence can be said
to operate (i.e. social power );
2. Within the above spheres o f activity, certain self-regulative frameworks are
established called ethics;
3. There is a certain space o f discourse that provides a forum for the above to operate
within;
4. This cognitive field o f action is not structured by “determinism” or “causation” (i.e.
mathematical logic or biological necessity).
The following will be the basic research questions:
1. What are power and ethics?
2. How do power and ethics limit each other"’
3. What characterizes the contexts o f the interaction of power and ethics?
4. How are power and ethics interactive in the spheres of discourse that effect social
work?
5. How may individual social workers utilize knowledge o f the above interactions in
developing “practice wisdom”?
The following will be the “substantive” or working assumptions:
I . The availability and conceptualization of “power” influences choices o f actions
taken
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2. An individual’s recognition o f ethics potentially limits the uses o f power; ethics
itself has “power” that it is able to meet “power” with;
3. Power and ethics are socially constructed concepts;
4. Power can be “used” constructively and destructively;
5. Within each academic discipline there are differences in the social constructions of
power and ethics;
6. The academic activity occurring in disciplines social work draws information from
affects social work.
Finally, the methodological assumptions are as follows:
1. The boundaries between power and ethics are determinable;
2. These boundaries can be delineated by studying the ways that conceptual
descriptions o f constructs, relevant to social work, within a given academic
discipline are expressed;
3. There are linguistic components (i.e. speech acts; things done with words etc.) of
the theoretical descriptions which display the power/ethical structures;
4. These linguistic components (i.e. phrases, metaphors, terms, etc.) can be explored
“deconstructively” / “critically” to analyze their assumptions and applications to
informational resources utilized by social workers.
While this project only uses a portion o f the above described research
framework, it does so for reasons consistent with the projects goals. The framework
provides some specificity through which to analyze the specific intents o f culling out
presuppositions from the texts to be utilized as informational resources. Also, this
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framework was designed by Von Ekardt with the scientific research paradigm in mind.
That paradigm is not amenable to the idea of social constructions o f realities and would
seek “objectivity” which the social construction perspective views as inadequate to
social interaction and, for the purposes o f this project, is inadequate for the intent of
clarifying hidden discretionary power misuses.
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CHAPTER n

PHILOSOPHIC.\L GROUNDWORK

IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Outlined above are the contours of the philosophical groundwork upon which
lie the themes of interest to social work drawn from the particular fields to be
explored. In this section an attempt will be made to narrow the philosophical topic
matter under scrutiny to those philosophical themes arising in a review of the social
work literature and from a review of the literature in disciplines social work draws
upon. The field of metaphysics will not be explored to the depth that ethics and
epistemology will be. Metaphysics provides the ground from which some themes
derive but social work is not engaged in generating metaphysical materials as a matter
of general practice. Social work is, however, pragmatically concerned with
epistemology and ethics so these two topic areas will be delved into in more detail.

Modernity/Postmodernity
This section begins with a characterization of modernity as a philosophical
trend in public discourse; in part so that each of the elements of the debate
postmoderaity poses as a philosophical trend in public discourse will be more clearly

29
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articulable. This characterization begins with four elemental shifts in the intellectual
landscape “modernity” took from “premodemity." “Modernity” signified shifts in (a)
the predominance of the secular over the ecclesiastical in forms and conceptions of
political power, sovereignty and legitimacy within the structured boundaries required
by the complexity of modem nation-states; (b) the type of commodities exchange from
a barter system to a money based system able to service market demand for extensive
personal ownership of mass produced goods; (c) the traditional interpersonal/political
ties generated and maintained by social hierarchies as well as redefinition of genderrole designations and practicalities to be defined by patriarchal forms, and. finally: (d)
the characterization of the general world view from religious to materialist (Hall.
1996; p.8). Lash and Friedman ( 1992) hold that “modemity is a matter of movement,
of flux, of change of unpredictability” ( p. 1). It reportedly was engendered as a force
for social change and progress from “ignorance and irrationality” into the new modes
of industrialization, bureaucracy, and the rational / objective, procedures and rules, and
humanist individual orientations (Rosenau, 1992). It is self-reflexive (d’Entreves &
Benhabib. 1996), serious, and possessed of visions of a comprehensive truth (Best &
Kellner. 1991; Rosenau, 1992). Modemity is “high,” for example, when, as with
Jurgen Habermas ( 1987). it is “utopian in it’s hope for a communicative paradise”
expressed in ethical discourse (Lash & Friedman, 1992; p.3) and “low” when, with
Marshall Berman ( 1992), it is pragmatic and focused on a “‘modemism in the
streets;”' expressed with a concem for an “ethics without blueprints” (Berman. 1992;
Lash & Friedman. 1992; p.3).
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Postmodemity, on the other hand, has been designated as a “discourse” vying
with the “totalizing” discourse of modemity in a playful, “insouciant” eclectic fashion
(Rosenau, 1992). It challenges (a) “all-encompassing world views, be they political,
religious or social”(Rosenau, 1992; p . 6); (b) modernity’s view that capitalism has done
anything to alleviate the suffering of the downtrodden or oppressed; (c) “hierarchical,
bureaucratic decision-making” (p.7) frameworks that privilege experts over
“everyman”; (d) the setting aside o f things emotional, metaphysical, mystical in favor of
the rational, (Best & Kellner, 1991; Rosenau, 1992). Postmodemity is said to be
bringing in a new “social formation” ushered in by innovative new technologies, all
requiring new conceptualizations to cope with the new modes o f experience
intersubjectivity and culture (Best & Kellner, 1991). Postmodemity centers around a
responsibility to othemess vs. modernism’s responsibility to act (d’Entreves, 1996).
Postmodemity can be either “skeptical,” offering a dark, gloomy nihilist visions o f
endings and disintegration, or “affirmative” offering a somewhat more optimistic view
about movement toward a newer configuration of non-ideological value positions
(Rosenau, 1992; p. 15). It generates new conceptions of meaning constmction locating
this meaning primarily in the local, immediate usages of language (Giroux, 1991;
Lyotard, 1984; Rosenau, 1992) rather than in a meta-narrative.
Pauline Rosenau (1992) has outlined the issues of contention in the modemitypostmodemity debate as they specifically apply to the social sciences and we will follow
her lead. First, there is question of what is a “text” and how a reader relates to what
s/he reads. Modemity sees the text as written by an author, the property o f that author
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and as such privileging the author over the text. Postmodemity would eliminate the
presence o f the author from an ownership association to her text. The reader of the
text is then the primary meaning-maker with regard to the text. Second, modemity put
forward a sense o f identity granted to an individual “subject.” This sense o f identity
granted some freedoms to the subject relative to it’s subject status. Postmodemity
would, in some cases, eliminate the idea “subject” and all the presuppositions that come
with this idea. Other views call for a completely revised “postmodem subject.” Third,
modernity holds to the position that history was important, that “time” and “space”
have specific locations that they identify and bound. Postmodemity would dissolve
these boundaries and would remove these constraints and limits to understanding
reality in different ways. Temporal juxtaposition of events comes into question.
Fourth, modemity holds that “theory” and “tm th” have a place in the scheme of thing
regarding an orientation to experience. Objectivity is possible if enough of the facts are
in place. Postmodemity holds that there is no “objective” truth and therefore no
groundwork on which to set any totalizing theoretical structures. Relative viewpoints
are valid. Fifth, modemity allowed for representation o f the knowable and to some
extent the unknowable in experience. Postmodemity would disallow the ability to
“represent” as a measure to confine and restrain that which is attempted to be
represented. Sixth, modemity set forth certain rules for methods o f accumulating and
generating knowledge. Objective, replicable causality was desired in order to
determine certainty. Postmodemity denies causality within the social sciences and
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resists rule structures that would privilege one form o f knowledge generation over
another. Realty is understood to be socially constructed at each given point in time
(Rosenau, 1992). Social workers are faced with variability in practice situations that
some o f the structures o f modernity do not allow for. Much o f the knowledge base o f
social work was generated within the framework o f modem social science and so took
for granted the sometimes dogmatic impositions o f structure and perspective on
situations where fluidity o f purpose and approach would have better served the client.
Postmodemity perhaps takes too far the attempted deconstruction o f existing social
structures in the attempt to expose social power abuses in their many forms but is
necessary to get at unquestioned presuppositions. The contemporary view of
knowledge as “local” and “socially constmcted” does more justice to the needs o f the
client populations served by social work practitioners. In the case o f a battered
woman, for example, socialization may have played a part in her staying in a situation
which was emotionally and physically abusive to her. Pattems o f socialized role
requirements may have left her without the perceived options to consider in deciding
whether or not to stay with her particular abusive partner. Her identity as wife and
m other may have left her without the idea that she is an individual woman and she need
not accept someone else’s social constriction of her reality. By proceeding with this
client in a direction that would take a less socially determined and a more immediately
determined perspective on her reality, she may be able to identify options for herself
that would serve to free her from the oppressive sort o f structure imposed by received
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views o f the female role within a family structure. In this way the existing maledominated structure supported in many places by modemity is questioned and
presuppositions that supported a situation of interpersonal power abuse are eliminated.

Metaphysical, Epistemological, Ethical,
Social Power Issue Grounding
Metaphysical concerns are reflected in debates about the postmodern “subject”
(Lyotard, 1984; Mohan, 1996, 1997) whether this is in questions about “identity” in
general (Smith & White, 1997) or the “self’ in particular (Mohan, 1996). The issue
focuses on how the identity o f the individual “client” is constructed socially (Kondrat,
1995; Laird, 1995) and how this could affect the client (Mohan, 1996; Smith & White,
1997). How does social work view the “development” o f a self (Beny, 1995; Germain,
1994) or “pathologies” o f the self (Cutler, 1991; Goldstein, 1990)? How do social
workers proceed in assessing these pathologies? Whose reality has authority? Do we
let the client’s story determine the outcome of this assessment (Raffbul & Holmes,
1986; Franklin & Jordan, 1995)? How do we proceed in treatment ( Dean & Fenby,
1989; Laird, 1995)?
One of the epistemological issues surfacing within the debate for the social
work field currently is the issue of “grand narratives” (Humphries, 1997; Leonard,
1996; Krueger, 1997) or “metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984; Rosenau, 1992). The
“metanarrative” according to Lyotard (1984) presumes a (modem) “metasubject” who
sees the issues, about which s/he is speaking, from outside and is therefore able to form
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the most appropriate response from this objective perspective (p.34). The question
here becomes an issue o f decision between theory (Bisno & Cox, 1997; Polansky,
1986) or “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1983) and which is to be privileged over the other
(Laird, 1995; Pardeck et al., 1994). This issue surfaces in determinations o f who is
published (Kondrat, 1995; Tucker, 1996), who decides what educational curricula to
mandate (Humphries, 1997), and which philosophical values are reflected in social
work activities (Dean & Fenby, 1989).
Ethics, in social work, has taken for it's subject matter, among other topics,
research processes (Gillespie, 1995), liability issues (Gelman, Pollack & Auerbach,
1996), assessment issues (Goldstein, 1990), educational curricula issues (Kayser,
Rothstein & Stevenson, 1997), and ethical, reflective practice issues (Abramson, 1996;
Reamer 1995). Ethical foci have been both other and self oriented illustrating the
different relative levels o f “moral self-development” (Kegan, 1982) among the
individual social worker decisions prompting the specific ethics research. Ethics in
social work, as in any field, is concerned with the resolution o f value conflicts between
personal and professional interests (Gillespie, 1995; Manning 1997; Reamer, 1995).
Proponents of the modemity / postmodemity debate in ethics include, (1) an overview
o f the field by Bauman (1993), (2) a modernist perspective from Habermas, (1990,
1993) and, (3) for postmodemity, Derrida, (1978). Somewhere between these two
positions is Foucault (1983). We will look more closely at these positions below.
Social power concerns in social work can be delineated through the themes of
“client self determination” (Ewalt, & Mokuau, 1995; Pinderhughes, 1983),
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“empowerment perspective” (Gutierrez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995; Kondrat, 1995;
Zippay, 1995), “strengths perspective” (Chapin, 1995; Goldstein, 1990; Weik &
Saleeby, 1995) and “social constructionist perspective” (Berlin, 1996; Goldstein, 1995)
with regard to our clients. With regard to ourselves as workers, issues o f social power
take the form o f differentiation of our field o f work (Abbott, 1995; Barber, 1995;
Tucker, 1996) and the privileging o f our research bases (Furr, 1995).

Philosophical Bases o f Social
Construction o f Knowledge
Social construction as a perspective is more than a technique o f approach to
practice (Neimeyer, 1993); it approaches the status o f a paradigm or in Masterson’s
(1970) terms a “metaparadigm” in that it provides “a new way o f seeing”, or “an
organizing principle governing perception itself’ (Masterson, 1970; p 65). To some
extent, whenever we argue for a particular viewpoint, we are engaged in the process o f
social construction. While a number of sources for social construction are utilized by
various social workers in different applications (Granvold, 1996; Hoffman, 1990;
Imbrogno, 1996; Franklin & Jordan, 1995), Kenneth Gergen, (1985) following Berger
& Luckmann ( 1966), delineated a framework for “social construction” that can be
effectively utilized by contemporary social work researchers and practitioners in
understanding this perspective. Gergen (1985) makes the following points:
1. social reality can not be limited to the “maps” o f reality, constructed with concepts
expressed in the words used to describe that reality, without taking into
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consideration the linguistic contexts operated within. These include, but are not
limited to, intention, sense data, and motivation;
2. words used are “social artifacts” dependent on the participation o f the two (or
more) individuals between which the words occurred, and the reference bases of
these individuals (i.e. cultural, geographic, philosophical, political, symbolic etc.);
3. the degree to which a given understanding remains valid across time and contexts
“evolves” as do the ways structures determining what obtains as socially acceptable
categories defining that which is included in various concepts;
4. the negotiated forms o f social interactivity have significance for maintaining
pattems o f interaction which may become identified as “culture” or “norms” and
which can be applied to actions and persons. (Gergen, 1985)
Gergen (1985) identifies social construction as “exogenic” or deriving from “events in
the world” or “endogenic” when derived fi"om processes seated in the organism
(p.269). As we will show social construction o f concepts influences every category o f
experiences we are concemed with in this study including communication (Lakoff,
1980), ethics (Richardson, 1995), social power (Goldman, 1972), and social work
research and practice (Fisher, 1995; Furr, 1995; Granvold, 1996; Imbrogno, 1996).

Metaphysics
O f the constmcts identified above as metaphysical (Honderich, 1995) we will
limit our treatment to three o f most concem to social work; identity,
appearance/reality, and causation. The questions addressed here will be concemed
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with how contemporary metaphysical issues find their way into social work discourses
and will be traced through the paths social work takes to define it’s positions relative to
these issues. As with other disciplines, social work derives it’s philosophical positions
from sources it views as reflecting it’s clientele’s interests in it’s efforts to “broaden it’s
knowledge base” (Reamer, 1993). Frequently these sources are contemporary and so
are affected by the contemporary debates moving through the field drawn upon.
Sometimes outmoded sources are used because o f their status as “authorities” within a
field o f endeavor. While it may seem to many social workers that metaphysical
questions are far removed from the daily actions social workers must take in their
work, many o f these everyday decisions are based on uninspected metaphysical
positions. These positions may have been present with the social worker when s/he
entered the field, they may have been conveyed by a favorite mentor or they may have
been consciously instilled by the educational curricula mandated by contemporary
Council on Social Work Education [CSWE] accreditation standards. If the individual
social worker makes decisions based on unrecognized precedents it can be harmful to
the client population dealt with. For example, with the abuser o f the battered woman
mentioned earlier, many o f the social role expectations that “allow” him not to question
his physically abusive behavior are accepted as traditional ways for men to act in their
environments. To not be adept at management of emotional conflict, to physically
address perceived threats to his emotional well being, and to consider it the “place” of
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the woman to act in certain ways regarding him may be part of his received role as a
man in society.
Some social workers come into the field knowing their own minds regarding
their personal philosophies regarding issues that they care about deeply. Some social
workers only discover these values through the course of their work. Values
surrounding the social power generally come into question for any individual having to
get along in contemporary society. What will be attempted here will be to clarify the
currents o f power and ethics as they are expressed in the modem/postmodem context
o f contemporary society. This is intended to provide social workers with a more
adequate knowledge o f this philosophical groundwork as it affects even the most
familiar and cherished beliefs systems as well as providing a key to understanding (and
better serving) populations o f individuals with differing philosophical positions.
First delineated will be three metaphysical issues that are currently considered
relevant in social work literature. Then follows a look at how academic fields social
work derives material for knowledge production from frame these themes in their
literature. Then how the modemity/postmodemity debates reflect the meeting places
between power and ethics issues relative to these issues is discussed.

What Questions are Viable
Viable questions in the social construction of categories pertinent to social
work practice relative to identity concem “minds and the mental” and in social work
are expressed in the question o f what constitutes “self’ (Spencer & Adams, 1990). The
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questions o f appearance/reality may be related to “norms and values” about what, for
social work, constitutes “illness” (Gorenstein, 1984). Finally, questions about
causation bring up issues o f “free will” and, for social work, concern about what
constitutes “power” (Pinderhughes, 1993).
Among the other issues in the debate about “self’ is the issue o f making
meaning. What are the dimensions o f “meaning?” Two main streams o f thought within
theories o f meaning to be explored here are the linguistic and the existential
(Honderich, 1995). The explication of this issue will encompass tributaries to both
streams. Is meaning objectively determined or does it belong exclusively to the
individual (Barwise, 1988)7 Do I let someone else’s view of me determine who I am or
is this a decision I must come to on my own internal information alone (Nagel, 1986)"’
Who decides the answer to these questions? Modemity wanted the “subject “ to be
able to define herself at any given juncture based on objective criteria. The subject as
“self’ had the power to define his own world and who s/he was in it. Postmodemity
would, altematively, take away this freedom of self-definition in favor o f the view that
merely linguistic convention determines the self and give the individuality back to the
individual without the “subject-ivity”(Rosenau, 1992). For the former to obtain means
that the person’s sense o f self is still tied to the demands o f the collective whatever
form that takes. For the latter to hold, the person is able to completely define
themselves regardless o f extemal norms.
A specific aspect o f the “illness” construct is what constructs the health issue.
What is “illness” and what is “wellness”? This brings up the question o f what the thing
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referred to as “health"’ is. A “substance” is said to be a semi-permanent referent that
can be recognized as existing in reality (Wiggins, 1995; p.214). Are the properties that
“health” has consistent and incontrovertible? Even within the framework of mental
health, the properties o f the thing health change from discovery to discovery. Illness is
sometimes said to be “little more than a descriptive label for behavior most of us find
unusual, unpleasant or annoying. (Lilienfeld, 1995; p.3). What “norm” or measuring
stick is this “health” issue compared to? Thomas Szasz (1960) maintains that illness is
simply a deviation from a norm that is psychosocially, ethically and legally determined
(Lilienfeld, 1995; p.6). Who decides who fits the measurement and who doesn’t?
This issue is inevitably a question o f dual focus; what is good for the individual
balanced against what is good for society (Nagel, 1986; p. 187). While norms are
established by the modem perspective in order to give a sense o f place in the overall
scheme of things, the postmodern would eliminate normative positions that are seen to
be ideologically designated (Rosenau, 1992).
With the issue o f “power” comes questions about how it causes effects in the
individual in her/his immediate environment. What does power do'’ Concerns
frequently about whether it is “held” and “used” by individuals or by collectives,
intentionally or unintentionally, whether this done so legitimately or illegitimately and
whether this action effects the actions o f others (Lukes, 1991; p. 83). How does it
effect it’s goals? Individuals try to answer questions like this in terms o f ‘if that hadn’t
happened this would not have happened.’ These decisions are said to pose a potential
other set o f circumstances or a “counterfactual” situation (Bennett, 1993) that, having
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not occurred, a given situation would not be what it is. Does this mean that we think
the potential event would have happened if we (or someone else) had not done
something to change it? This leads to question o f whether our action actually could
have been different or if it was “determined” in some way. “Do we have free will?”
The answer one gives oneself to this question significantly alters how one makes
decisions and how one views the world (Dennett, 1984). While modernity assures
individuals that the will is in fact free, there is still much dispute over the idea as a
metaphysical postulation (Nagel, 1986). Postmodern skeptics “dispute...the
assumptions ensuring this free will” (Rosenau, 1992; p.21) and delineate constraints
placed on it by the mechanisms o f society. Affirmative postmodernists explore
“postmetaphysical” directions.
The questions social workers ask themselves and their clientele about specific
issues are structured by many influences in the environment. This environment includes
the knowledge constructions available at the time the questions are being asked and the
restrictions the individual social worker is under from the employing auspices. For
social workers to frame their questions in terms that take into consideration social
power influences requires a knowledge o f how these influences can affect the questions
asked as well as the philosophical concepts and currents represented in the terms used
to ask the questions.
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Post-Metaphysical Thinking
This perspective is followed for a number of reasons. This section is named for
a text written by Jurgen Habermas (1993) and will follow his argument for the types o f
issues the social sciences are most concerned with. The modemity/postmdemity debate
brings into question the viability of the category “metaphysical” and yet some of the
debate's issues are still centered on classical metaphysical themes.
Habermas’ (1993) modem position, in contrast to the themes o f (a) “totalizing
thinking that aims at the one and the whole,” (b) “objectivistic self-understanding of
science and technology,” (c) “an unsituated reason that had been idealistically
apotheosized,” and a tendency to posit the (d) “precedence of theory over practice,”
set forth a new “procedural rationality,” a “detranscendentalizaion o f inherited basic
concepts,” and a shift to a “linguistic turn” in philosophy which occurred within the
context o f a “lifeworld background” (Habermas, 1993; pp.33-53). His procedural
rationality looks to dealing with immediate reality in interactive ways not based on
some precedent o f contextual unity. The detrancendentalization would leave reason
situated in the space between individual thinkers bounded only by their mutual abilities
to generate and utilize rule systems for communication for their mutual benefits rather
than based on a priori guidelines. A linguistic turn would situate language as the tool
and structural edifice by which meaning is generated between individual “subjects”
without depriving them o f their differences. The lifeworld background will set the
“horizon” within which the interactiveness of all disciplines with philosophy can be
facilitated to accord pragmatic concerns a validity equaling that accorded to theory.
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Habermas here sets the parameters for the social constructionist perspective from his
socio-critical frame.
Postmodemity maintains a need to get away from all “meta-narratives”; from
the need for a “we” that is all inclusive. Richard Rorty (1992) maintains that this “we”
position ethnocentrically constrains difference and looks for a “true self’ o f all men
instead o f recognizing individual contingent historical reality. I. M. Young (1992)
parallels this position with her focus on the need to recognize that difference has as
much value as unity or consensus. She maintains that the call to universal agreement
privileges unity over differences. Rorty holds that this creates a situation that stifles the
voices o f difference; that it deprives them o f a voice to speak their differences into
(p.85). Baudrillard (1984) would cast aside all attempt to generate a structure from
which to generate meaning claiming that it conceals through depth and that what is
needed is visible transparency o f textuality. He would allow “infinite proliferation” of
potential meanings in such a way as to deprive the subject the ability to instill
sovereignty over the object. He would end the ability of the subject to subject the
object to it’s whim and instead take the position o f the object itself. He would take
everything to it’s logical absurdity in order to generate new unseen meanings (Best &
Kellner, 1991; pp. 126-133). These meanings and the ways they would be constructed
would ‘always already” be only “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1983) and would eschew
the standard ways o f epistemological procedure.
Social workers willing to take on the burden of a new framework for argument
in developing practice knowledge will be benefited by knowing the frameworks that the
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pervious modes o f argumentation were founded on as well as what potential new
frameworks could look like. Arguments based on precedents from one side or the
other o f the modemity/postmodemity debate present the individual social worker with
different kinds o f premises from which to build arguments. These expanded sets of
possible structures provide aid in making the most potentially power-balanced decisions
within the given moment o f argument or knowledge construction.

Epistemology
Historically, epistemology has been concerned with the nature o f knowledge
and truth; is associated with metaphysics, logic and truth; and investigates questions
such as; a) is knowledge possible’, b) what are it’s limits?, c) what are it’s origins?, d)
how is it obtained?, e) what is the proper method to use in obtaining it?, f) how is it
constituted?, g) what is it’s structure?, and h) what is the relation between knowledge
and truth (Runes, I960)? Contemporaneously, these questions are approached through
the framework o f a number o f specific problem areas; ( I ) justification looks at the
kinds o f things we hold as beliefs and the various type o f beliefs we can have; (2)
structure o f justification determines what evidence is used to come to the point that we
call a belief justified; (3) knowledge must be defined by where we find it and who has
determined what it is; (4) skepticism is concerned with the reasoning process going into
knowledge construction and even the mere possibility o f knowledge; (5) naturalistic
epistemology evaluates the strategies utilized in the processes of justification and belief
in all systems o f knowledge (Honderich, 1995). Here concern will be focused on that
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“naturalistic epistemology” (Komblith, 1994) which encourages interdisciplinary input
to knowledge formulation.
Social w ork is more directly focused on issues of knowledge construction than
with the metaphysical issues which are part o f this knowledge construction. This is
exemplified, historically, in social work’s primarily “logical positivist” approach to
research methodology (Reamer, 1993; Reid, 1995; L. Williams, 1995; Wodarski, Feit,
& Green, 1995). This is due primarily to an emphasis on the need in social work to
justify research results through “objective verification” (Reamer, 1993; p. 122). Herein
lies a main point in the modemity/postmodemity debate in social work epistemology;
the connection point between values and knowledge and between observer objectivity
and subjectivity. This debate is expressed by the modem view that an objective, value
free, scientific position is possible while the postmodern perspective maintains that all
knowledge is subjective, value laden and socially constructed (Rosenau, 1992; p. 110).
In this section w e will address the issue o f how knowledge is constructed in general
ways and how the modem/postmodem debate is reflected in the process.

Building Blocks o f Knowledge Construction
Contemporary issues in epistemology span a number o f dimensions including;
subjective vs. objective knowledge (Wright, 1993), local vs. universal knowledge
(Geertz, 1983), is there truth? (Cooper, 1993), the “mind/body problem” (Nagel,
1994), and the functioning of reason (Nozick, 1993; Stich, 1990).
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At this point it is possible to pose another question; “whose perspective on
answering these questions will be admitted to the discourse on the questions
epistemology recognizes as valid?” Further, who determines what is a valid question
for epistemology to be concerned with? Each o f the thinkers in the “genealogy” of
epistemology outlined above shifted the way their field o f interest was viewed by their
contemporaries. Each time a new thinker comes to prominence, s/he reconstructs or
redefines the way that history, and the thinkers s/he privileges, are viewed (Collins,
1985). This, in it’s essence, promotes the “paradigm shift” that Kuhn (1970) describes.
And yet Masterson (1970) found that Kuhn (1970) characterized “paradigm shift” in 21
different ways. She has grouped these characterizations into three categories; those
detailing philosophical areas are “metaphysical paradigms,” those generating social
recognition are “sociological paradigms,” and those instrumentally oriented are
“construct paradigms” (Masterson, 1970; p.65). Though it shares elements o f the
construct paradigm in it’s linguistic elements, social construction o f knowledge is
primarily a metapardigm. Before we turn to social constructionist perspectives, we will
review briefly the current generally accepted modes o f generating knowledge.
According to Kim (1994), justification is a “normative,” (that is a regulative)
notion. For a belief to be “justified” is for it to be acceptable generally; it is an ideal.
Justification is the action o f accepting the belief. Certain conditions must be “analyzed
and identified” as being in evidence for the action ofjustiScation to take place. One
part o f these conditions includes there being “foundational” sets of “beliefs” or “truths”
that our currently-in-process belief (x) is being compared to. Then, the current belief
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will be decided to be “justified” just to the extent it follows from or is coherent with the
other already established beliefs or truths. The previous beliefrtruth is the “evidence”
for the justification o f the current belief x (Kim, 1994). Throughout these and other
arguments on justification, the previously established set o f truths or beliefs was
established by someone before us.
Next, follows a look at what constitutes a “belief' and how creation knowledge
occurs by revising beliefs. Gilbert Harman (1994), in setting out a theory o f belief
revision, delineates some of what he sees as basic types o f beliefs. He divides beliefrevision theories into “foundations” and “coherence” types. Basic beliefs within the
foundational theory are those beliefs which are intrinsically justified; that is, they do not
rely on other beliefs for their justification. Other beliefs are grounded in reference to
these basic beliefs. Beliefs are either “explicit” or “implicit”; frequently, explicit beliefs
are founded on implicit beliefs. Within the foundational framework these beliefs cannot
be infinitely circular; that is, they cannot rely on other beliefs ad infinitum.
Within the coherence theory, if all the beliefs that one holds fit together and do
not contradict one another, then one is justified in retaining these beliefs. In contrast to
the foundations theory, the justifications can be circular and infinite. If one finds that
one’s justification for holding a belief is removed, (usually by a gain o f information
from an outside source) then one simply adjusts that belief to accommodate the new
information. One o f the main goals of Harman’s belief revision is to explore why
people hold onto beliefs when their justification has been revised. His view is that
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while the foundations view is more appealing to our intuitions (and our sense o f logic)
the coherence theory is the one we actually use to revise our beliefs (Harman, 1994).
The final element to be explored will be that o f truth. There are a number of
ways o f understanding “truth” as a term. Truth is a “value” as related to utterances of
language (Quine, 1980), or to relations o f propositions to each other. In these cases it
is a “logical” term. Truth is related to the “nature o f being” in metaphysical texts
(Collingwood, 1940) but for our purposes, Michael Friedman’s ( 1994) account will
align theories o f truth with building o f knowledge. Friedman establishes a connection
between truth and confirmation; knowledge that has been confirmed is “true”
knowledge. He maintains that “theories are confirmed” if their “observational
consequences are true” (Friedman, 1994; p. 168). Another way to say this is that
theories are true if they correspond to the facts observed (Popper, 1979). And yet, as
Friedman points out, the “facts” then must be proven to be true. In addition, he points
out that knowledge contains “non-observational statements” which must be sorted out.
He proposes that statements that make up a theory must be set within a notion o f
“limits.” When the collected set o f observations are as complete as they can be at the
specific point in time when the knowledge is formulated (Friedman, 1994). So how do
social workers use these building blocks in social construction o f knowledge bases? All
o f the above epistemological constructs proceed from the modernist perspective that
requires and supports a privileging o f metanarratives and universal views.
It has been necessary to go into some depth with the explication o f the generally
accepted view o f knowledge construction for two reasons; (a) to represent all the
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potential areas where structures o f the traditional modem perspective come into play
with received views o f epistemology and (b) to represent how other philosophical
themes are present but not explicit within the framework of traditional epistemology.
Even within the above described structure exist adherents to either side o f the
modemity/postmodemity debate. Their usage o f specific philosophical terms and
concepts within the context o f their epistemological endeavor expresses their particular
perspectives and prejudices as well as with whom they align their assignment of
authority and thus social power.

Building Blocks o f Social Construction
o f Knowledge
A shift to a look at a more postmodem epistemological form expressed in the
social constructionist scholarship follows. The focus here is limited to the four aspects
o f social construction we have derived from Gergen (1985) above. Beginning with
conceptual and linguistic contexts a look is taken at what affects these elements used in
generating social work knowledge and how the modemity/postmodemity debate affects
these elements. One frequently overlooked aspect of everyday thinking is how the
metaphors o f vernacular speech can structure the concepts social workers use with
clients and in social work research. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) describe how the
concepts used to describe that which is not common in terms o f that which is common
(in whatever context) structures how things are framed and how things are done in
everyday life (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980 p.454). Everyday thinking is reflected in
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communications with others and can display many things about how individuals act in
the world and what values are important. It also can display intersubjective
incongruities o f thought relative to other minds (p.455).
The linguistic contexts within which these concepts are expressed take into
closer consideration how the terms we use contribute to the issue. Here the questions
become, (a) what was the intended meaning of the linguistic expression uttered
(Habermas, 1992; p.58)? and, (b) from within whose frame o f reference does the
desired meaning derive (p.44)? The very frame o f “social construction” itself presumes
a context which includes an agent and some “construction materials” (i.e. materials of
knowledge) and yet says nothing about a plan for the construction that takes place.
This area o f knowledge construction becomes a marginal space. And yet it places the
locus o f knowledge generation, which determines the existence o f things, in the
possession o f the human individual (van Dijk, 1994; p. 108); not in some reality that we
see through but darkly’. The view that the words we use in sentences are “social
artifacts” is underlined by Austin (1979) in the argument he delineates about whether or
not there is a “single thing called the meaning” of a word or even of a sentence (Austin,
1979; p.60). Austin further talks about the denotative and connotative meaning of
words having referents located in the objects themselves vs. referents located in the
communicative activity between the perceivers (Austin, 1979; p.57).
The understandings o f the meanings of terms, contexts and the sentences in
which they used, as well as the contexts within which they occur between even the
same two individuals at different times, are continually evolving or “updated and
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changed by various types o f mental operations such as... interpretation, inference,
categorization and evaluation.. .” ( van Dijk, 1994; p. 112). The meanings o f the same
information can be understood in different ways by groups separated by ideological,
power, or other marginalizing differences such as race, gender, religious background
(van Dijk, 1994; p. 117). These same meanings are revised through a process o f
“recursive communication” Krippendorf (1994) through which one’s communications,
one’s understanding o f these communications, one’s practices, and one’s view o f these
practices, are adjusted through recursive communication loops encountering the same
components functioning in a second agent with whom one is in contact (Krippendorf,
1994; p. 85). This describes the communication view o f social construction.
Giddens (1987) relates that the “‘linguistic turn’...explores the intersection
between language and the constitution o f social practices” (Giddens, 1987; p . 199). It
enables individuals to know what these practices are and how to maneuver among
exigencies o f everyday life to make functional decisions. “Contexts form settings of
action whose qualities agents routinely draw upon in the course of orientating what
they do and what they say to one another” (Giddens, 1987; p.215). The “things”
drawn upon are “cultural artifacts” and require a “medium of transmission across
contexts”, “a means o f storage” and “a means o f retrieval” (p.216) in order to be put to
use. All these items are functions o f the communicative activity of the individual with
other individuals or his/her environment.
Postmodemity’s position towards epistemology is most adequately reflected in
the social construction perspective (Rosenau, 1992). According to this view, there are
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no objective perspectives that enable the observer to disentangle her/his value positions
even when s/he knows what they are and expresses them up front. These value
positions crop up in the metaphors o f everyday speech that individuals engaged in
conversation do not stop to consider in each moment of the conversation. Modernity’s
perspective would be more adequately reflected in the view that privileges
“foundationalist” (Benhabib, 1996; Fairlamb, 1994) frames o f reference that would
provide normative information through consesensually accepted elements of an
externally verifiable reality. These pieces of information would be value free and would
reflect no ideological o r research standpoint. But is this realistic? Does this view hide
from itself the privileging o f sameness over difference (Benhabib, 1996). It is just here
that ethical considerations come into play in answering these questions.

Ethics
Twentieth century ethics spans a vast array o f philosophical work. Most widely
stated, the concern o f ethics and moral philosophy is with “right and wrong action”
(Honderich, 1995; p. 591). Before briefly outlining the field and narrowing the focus to
what will be considered here, the difference between “ethics” and “morality” must be
delineated. For the moment we will simply define this difference. Below more detail
about their distinctions and their similarities will be related. In delineating the
difference between ethics and morality, Williams (1995a) states that “...the terms
‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ do have slightly different resonances.

Ethical’ (derived from a

Greek word for personal character) carries a broader conception, including a concern
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with the value o f different kinds of life and activity; ‘moral’ (derived from a Latin word
for social custom) tends to narrow it’s interests to rules and obligations, and to the
experiences and considerations most closely related to those...” (Williams, 1995a;
p. 546). Williams further states that confidence is a “desirable state” for one to be in
with regard to one’s ethical precepts; not having confidence (note that certainty is not
required) can give rise to a “general doubt” (Williams, 1995b; p.203). This general
doubt can lead to ethical quandaries (Bauman, 1993; p. 21) and errors o f decision
making and may set the stage for akratic action. Bauman (1993), while agreeing on
this latter point, generally views “morality” as more encompassing in it’s ability to
express the completeness o f a self and “ethics” as more restricted to sets o f rules
“wishing to be the moral code” (Bauman, 1993; p.21). Bauman’s perspectives will
generally be followed in treating moral/ethical questions.
It must be stated at the outset that what is sought here is not just one more
ethical perspective that would presume to set itself alongside other extant ethical
positions. The ethical position of this study will be more aligned with a reflexive
“moral judgment” (Honderich, 1995, Thomas, 1993) technique that would, among
other issues, be addressing, in social work specifically, the problem of “akrasia”
(Broadie, 1994; Honderich, 1995; McIntyre, 1990), or akratic decisions based on
unexamined philosophical positions coming into play at crucial times within the
decision making process. In Broadie’s (1994) succinct terms, “how can a person
knowingly and freely engage in an action that s/he regards as inferior to some other
action understood by him/her to be, at the time, an available option (Broadie, 1994;
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p. 229)?” Going into the philosophical minutiae of this question would take us out of

the scope o f his project but the practical course of reflexive moral judgment will be
framed with this question in mind. Elements of this question will resurface with regard
to the meeting places, the “margins”, o f power and ethics discussed below.
In the following sections then, discussion covers the scope of the topics “ethics”
and “morality” and the differences between these two frames o f reference as described
above. The contours o f the modemity/postmodemity debate in these areas will be
outlined. Finally we will focus on the elements of that middle ground that a social
worker must delineate for him/herself in order to make good decisions in everyday
practice and research decisions.

Ethics/Morality Distinctions
Ethics in it’s widest sense includes theoretical and applied branches. The
applied branch will be immediately eliminated as it looks at questions more narrowly
focused which will be delineated later. Theoretical ethics includes “metaethics” and
“normative ethics.” Metaethics subsumes questions o f the nature o f morality, moral
psychology, and moral epistemology. Normative ethics includes issues o f duty and
issues o f value. Some o f the most significant ethical positions include “Divinecommand” views. Rationalism, Intuitionism, Consequentialism, Justice, Prescriptivism,
and Emotivism (Honderich, 1995, p.940). Within the scope o f this project, which does
not purport to be review o f ethical theories, we will not be proceeding systematically
through delineations o f each theory’s positions and then supporting one that fits our
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value preferences. Reamer ( 1993) has already provided an overview o f these theories
and it is unnecessary to duplicate his work here. Having done so, he sets the stage for
the next section o f our project. Where he outlined the whole field o f philosophical
input to ethical theory, here focus will be on specific philosophical elements o f ethics
relevant to the social work issues highlighted above.
Bauman (1993) characterizes modem moral/ethical thinking as making certain
presumptions about the moral character of humanity in general. M odem ethicists saw
human “evil” as a sort o f inborn trait that individuals could not overcome by themselves
(Ricoeur, 1974). According to this view, people needed ethical systems o f rule to
provide for an ideal to follow in order to approach morality. Individuals were told that
individuals could not possibly know what their own best interests were since they don’t
have the discernment o f the authorities who have determined what these interests were
for them. In order for individual’s best interests to be met appropriately, resources
must be restricted to what the “wise” thought best. According to this view, these wise
men based their decisions on emotion-free reason and this type o f thinking is not
available to the common man (Bauman, 1993).
Bauman’s (1993) view o f postmodem morality sees the individual as the moral
actor responsible for all his/her decisions and as capable o f coming to these decisions
unencumbered by the constraints o f an ethical system imposed from outside
him/herself. Where modem ethics constructed ethical systems to combat irrationality,
ambiguity and emotion, these efforts were part of the illusion that to do so
(construction o f systems) would eliminate these non-rational elements fi'om the
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everyday activities o f individuals. The focus in postmodemity is shifting from being
ethical for the requirements of a law-like set o f rules prescribing behavior, to selfdetermined morality that must be constructed in the moment of decision making
between tw o individuals. Moral judgement becomes here the province o f the individual
rather than the collective (Bauman, 1993).
W hat are the characteristics o f moral judgement that social workers may
reflexively develop? Thomas (1993) designates five problems he considers pertinent to
the functioning o f moral judgement. The first of these is the “specification o f moral
judgement” wtiich includes an aspect o f characterization such as universality, a
designation o f “objects” of moral focus such as actions of individual agents or
collectivities, and, finally, the “elucidation o f moral concepts”; a specific array or
“range” o f moral concepts including but not limited to types or linguistic analyses of
concepts such as ‘good’ or ‘treacherous’ The second is “moral judgement and the
moral standard” wtiich includes, on the one hand, the “moral criterion”, a type of
reference point such as “monism”, “pluralism” or “particularity”, and on the other hand
a “moral ideal” which looks more to a kind o f person “I ought to be” . The third
problem is that o f “justification o f moral judgement” and includes the means by which
judgements justify themselves such as truth claims, rational procedures or “natural”
moral qualities. The fourth problem is the connection between “logic, reasoning, and
moral judgem ent” and concerns itself with the questions o f structural validity o f moral
arguments like the “is-ought gap” which attempts to derive an evaluation fi"om
descriptions, the “ought implies can” or the “naturalistic fallacy” in which a moral
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description is taken as a real property. The fifth problem concerns “moral judgement
and moral responsibility” and incorporates excuses from culpability, free will vs.
determinism, and punishment and forgiveness (Thomas 1993; pp. 1-24). Although
much o f Thomas’ argument is structured from modem perspective, these faculties
must be attended to and developed as elements of ethical grounding used by the
postmodern reflective moral agent in search of answers to the questions concerning
expressions o f power involved in practice decisions and research generation in social
work practice.

Modemity/Postmodemity and Ethics in Practice
The modemity/postmodemity debate in the problems of ethics and moral
philosophy follows the contours o f the linguistic tum in philosophy in general
(Honderich, 1995). The effects that the modernity / postmodemity debate have on
contemporary ethics issue will be o f foremost interest and practical significance to
social workers. To some extent professional codes o f ethics would not be necessary if
there were not abuses o f power in some form or another (Reamer, 1993; p.41), but
ethics itself addresses wider concems than those dealing only with issues o f power.
These elements may draw upon different aspects o f different theoretical positions at
different times. With regard to this study, these will include those issues within which
power meets ethics in practical questions.
The constructs “self’, “illness” and “free will” become topics o f ethical as well
as metaphysical and epistemological concern. With “authority” comes the questions
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about how the worker orients to the client self; client morality as perceived by a social
worker; “victim” or “perpetrator” status as perceived by client and worker; and client
need for information. All are foci o f how we might exercise authority unwittingly or
consciously in our roles as social workers (Reamer, 1993; pp.62-63). Do social
workers take a “paternalistic” view of the client; claiming that the client needs help and
we are the expert who knows what help it is that they need regardless o f what the
client’s view is o f this help?
Decisions about “illness” of a client are closely associated to the view, or
perspective, that we as social workers know what “mental illness” is, that a decision by
a client to commit suicide is the product of a ‘sick’ mind and needs our intervention to
stop the client from making this decision (Reamer, 1993 p.52) yet by other views, this
decision is not the province o f anyone outside the individual who is making the decision
about him/herself (Hillman, 1964; Szasz, 1986). What kind of problems social workers
see the client to have (regardless, sometimes, of the client’s own perspectives)
determine what treatment provisions are made or whether assistance is given
(Gitterman, 1991; Reamer, 1993; pp. 59, 63).
What kind of free will do social workers allow to clients? Do clients see
themselves as having free will or do they see their lives as determined by some fate
(Reamer, 1993; p.60)? How do workers contribute to a client’s sense o f helplessness
through our accommodating “their needs” through our (rather than their) perspective
o f what those needs are? There is, in social work currently, a focus in client selfdetermination or “empowerment” (Gutierrez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995;
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Pinderhughes, 1983; Reamer, 1993) but do social workers facilitate empowerment or
are they seen by the client as a further cause of their ill fate? Do we tell ourselves that
our clients misfortune was due to his drug use and he couldn’t help it or do we allow
that he could have made different choices? And what decisions do we make about him
at this choice point relative to services rendered’
What perspective do social workers have on our own system of ethics/morality’
Do social workers have illusions that we must shed about our clients and ourselves?
Do we take the modem view that the client is trying to rip the system off for all s/he
can (Bauman, 1993; p. 30; Handler, 1993) or do we take the postmodern view that the
client is only taking what is needed to survive (Handler, 1993; p.48). Do social
workers make decisions based on our perceptions o f what the clients best interests are
in our perspective, modeling a modem view (Bauman, 1993; p.27), or, taking the
postmodem view, allow that the clients decisions are the best they can make at the time
(ibid, p. 47)? Do we take the modem view that the poverty stricken are unable to be
different (Bauman, 1993; Mincy, 1994; Heclo, 1994) or do we take the postmodem
view o f self-creating selves (Bauman, 1993, p. 72) able, with access to resources, to
make good decisions based on these resources? What are our views as social workers
about how and who has the power o f distributing the available resources?
The elements o f the philosophical groundwork described above become part of
a project aimed at the fullest understanding o f the underlying cognitive elements within
a theoretical knowledge structure that supports abuses o f social power whether
knowingly or unknowingly. The debate o f postmdemity with modernity in the rational-
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critical forum o f communicative interaction brings forward for inspection many of the
presupposed and therefore sometimes hidden abuses o f social power built into the very
frameworks designed to question these abuses. Elements of knowledge derived from
existing knowledge bases utilized in the construction of new knowledge bases, such as
in social work and related fields, may be questioned by the individual social worker
interested in generating knowledge free from social power abuses. Part o f how this
occurs is through the acknowledgment by the social worker that the knowledge
relevant to a given client/social worker dyad must be developed within that dyad with
supplements coming from outside to compliment that local knowledge base. Decisions
made require that the best interests o f the client served must be placed, ethically, ahead
o f the interests of the social worker’s comfort or the auspices’ financial concems.
These are not simple situations to make decisions within and the impetus to take the
easy, less personally conflicted way may be alluring. For example, when a client is
encountered in practice whose personal hygiene is non-existent and the consequent is
having to spend an unpleasant hour with this client, it may be more pleasant to shorten
service contact time for that client and perhaps neglect to provide some vitally needed
resource to that client. The social power exercised in that instance may be less visible
and overt than in the case o f the domestic violence situation but it exists nonetheless.
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SOCIAL POWER

Social power was once thought to be mainly the province of the field of
politics but is now being seen as more pervasive than that (Van Den Bergh & Cooper,
1995). There are representative theories about how power operates within each field
of endeavor that social work commonly draws upon for information in knowledge
construction including anthropology (Wilson. 1988), communication (Krippendorf.
1991; 1994). law, (Hawkins. 1991) philosophy. (Foucault. 1972. 1977) politics
(Benhabib. 1996). psychology. (Flanagan & Rorty, 1990) and sociology. (Lukes.
1990).
Here each of these variations on theories of power is surveyed to delineate
effects on constructs of interest within each field covered by the scope of the current
project. In a later section specific aspects of theories of power from within each of
these fields will be highlighted as discussion centers on how ( 1) these theories meet
with ethical restraints within each of the individual fields. (2) how these theories are
affected by the modernity / postmodemity debate, and (3) how these theories might be
reflected in social work “practice wisdom”. Here primary concem will be with general
theories o f power. In addition, the concept of “authority" will be explored with regard
to how it functions as a middle or “marginal” term between power and individual
62
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“agents” affected by power. Also explored will be the concept o f the “margin” and the
“marginal” and how the mediating process take place through these spaces. It is
through this mediating process that power can privilege some and “marginalize” others.

Authority, Discretion and Decision Making
Authority is defined by R.B. Friedman (1990) as “power that is legitimized”
(p.60). As such the “authority” has assumed the license to act based on a set structure
for distribution o f the licensure it holds (Friedman, 1990). Authority is that middle
term that mediates between the holder o f power and the agent whose actions are
influenced by that power (Wolff, 1990). “Discretion” is the authority that acts as a
middle term for the individual in his decisions to act in a certain way given a situation
that has no rule to cover it (Hawkins, 1992). Decision making is integrally involved in
the areas of both authority and discretion. This section will describe the relations
between these three aspects o f social power
Authority can be said to function through two main categories of media;
organizational and individual. In the organizational category would be included
bureaucratic (Hummel, 1994) and organizational (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). While
most bureaucracies are also organizations, not all organizations function
bureaucratically. The forms decision making takes and the ways discretion is used set
some of the distinctions between these two aspects o f this level. In the individual
category, “norms” o f a community (Rae, 1988) or what Bordieu (1990) calls “habitus”
or collective practices o f small groups o f people who share a community cormection
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(Bordieu, 1990) exert influence over individuals. The final type is one of those varied
modes o f authority that one individual seeks to gain over another either granted by
sovereignty of some sort (Finnis, 1990) or coercive force (Airaksinen, 1992).
Individuals in all categories use or abuse discretion in some fi-om or fashion.
Discretion is identified by Hawkins (1991), writing in the legal field, as the
“space, as it were, between legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice” and
he goes on to say that this capacity may be “formally granted or it may be assumed”
(Hawkins, 1991, p. 11) . The latter usage o f authority is fi’equently seen to abuse it’s
discretionary ability to meet it’s own needs (Lane, 1988). Discretion, or the “space”
that is called discretion, is on or between the margins of rule fi-ameworks. “Those who
can no more rely on discretion need rules badly” (Bauman, 1993; p. 116). Authority,
(to be described below) also resident in this space between, acts sometimes to
“institutionalize experience” through discretion about when to apply rules because lives
and activities function more effectively when so structured (Feldman, 1991). Schneider
( 1991 ) has identified four modes through which decision makers use discretion.
“Khadi discretion” which he notes is not a Western form, takes cases individually
including “legal, ethical, emotional, and political considerations” (p.61). “Rule-failure”
discretion is given to an authority when a situation exists which is seen as so complex
rules cannot be imagined. “Rule-building” discretion applies to situations when
authorities are seen to be capable of constructing better rules than those which
currently exist in the situation approached. Finally, “rule-compromise” discretion
passes decision making authority on to an individual when the decision making body is
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unable to come to agreement on the rules (Schneider, 1991; p.61-65). Throughout our
discussion, we will be focusing on how authority, discretion and decision making occur
within fields o f unequal power relations. Though these dynamics take form and are
expressed through descriptions o f legal discourse, they are present and be applied to
everyday professional activities, including social work, and not limited to the legal
sphere.

Faces o f Authority
Here, the different forms o f authority and how the problems authority may be of
concem to social workers interested in becoming aware o f the functioning o f social
power in social work research and practice will be discussed. A description o f the
bureaucratic mode o f authority which many social workers work both under and
through in everyday tasks is given. Hummel (1994) relates that bureaucracy imposes
it’s structure on the individuals involved with it in six ways; “socially, culturally,
psychologically, linguistically, cognitively and politically (Hummel, 1994; p. 5).
Socially and culturally, bureaucracy attunes itself only to those aspects o f reality that
have been given recognition as being parts o f policy. Purportedly, this is the way that
organizational social action is organized in ways so that it can be measured responsibly.
Individuals go through “socialization” to internalize organizational “norms, values, and
attitudes” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 14-15). Psychologically and cognitively,
bureaucrats may seem to their clients (and even to themselves) to be “headless and
soulless” (Hummel, 1994, p.5) and frequently may be confused as to where their
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bureaucratie and real selves differ. Patterns o f “values” are rationally decided upon and
become part o f an indoctrination to a bureaucratic milieu (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991;
p 17). Linguistically, the terms used within the organization seem to outsiders to be
imbued with a secret mode o f meaning inaccessible to them. “Their discussion is
punctuated with multiple and diverse examples o f potential sources o f rationalized
myths: public opinion, educational systems, laws, courts, professions, ideologies,
technologies...” (Scott, 1991, p. 167) and the list goes on. “Bureaucratic language is
power language... ” (Hummel, 1994; p. 16) and bureaucratic users assume that clientele
must listen to them as if their voice was law
Regardless o f the field or academic discipline, there is an organization which
maintains the interests o f the field; whether this is in the practical application of the
field’s knowledge to it’s topic matter or as a progenitor of theoretical discourse. There
are organizational structures that are not bureaucratic in their approach to those who
they interact with. The new literature describes how organizations are now looking in
different directions to promote change that benefits not only themselves but asks
questions like ‘“ if organizations structure so closely how individuals think and act, how
does institutional change occur’” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; p.28)? Rather than the
slow moving ways we are used to seeing bureaucracies’ actions take, the new
organizations may have to implement “big bang” decisions where everything about the
previous structure the organization carried is changed in record time in response to an
external event (Manning, 1991). Policy decision making, previously inextricably linked
to values generated by the bureaucracy, may become associated with the more personal
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values (Dunn, 1993) o f a specific visionary CEO. Regardless of the type, organizations
express influence through some measure o f authority.
The first of two relatively individual levels o f authoritative influence we will
highlight will involve that structured by what Bordieu (1993) calls “habitus.”
DiMaggio & Powell (1991) outline four aspects of this “habitus” theory o f influence.
“First, it provides an alternative account to role theory o f the differentiation of
cognitive understandings and behavioral norms along social-structural lines.
Second, it moves beyond the Freudian imagery of “internalization” to posit a
generative grammar o f strategic behavior, rooted in but not fully determined by
the past. Third it is multidimensional in two senses: pointing to a substantive
theory o f practical evaluation rooted in differences in the habitus o f class
factions; and providing an account of “rational” strategies o f action as
themselves institutionalized. Fourth, it offers an alternative solution to the
Parsonian problem o f the allocations o persons to social positions (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1991; p.26).”
Bordieu (1990) says that the “habitus” produces and reproduces schemes and practical
activities based on the history o f the ways the constituents of these schemes and
activities have been evaluated and understood in the past. He maintains that it inscribes
an “active presence o f past experiences” in order to insure that the ways thing were
done in the past as the ways things are done now (Bordieu, 1991; p. 54). This pattern
parallels Eliade’s (1965) idea o f an “eternal return” where the original pattern o f action
for a culture is set down in it’s mythology and every subsequent generation must do the
thing, usually some ritual activities, the ways they were done in the past in order to
participate with the divinity in the act o f creation (Eliade, 1965).
The final individual mode o f authority occurs when an individual is given a right
to do something by a “power-holder,” an individual in possession o f a position that
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allow her the ability to grant such rights to others, as when one is in the position of
“expert” or “specialist” who, through some special knowledge, has been privileged to
act, or ratify actions o f others. As mentioned before, this authority can be legitimate or
it can be illegitimate yet claimed to be legitimate (Raz, 1990; p.2). It lies within the
purview o f the decisionmaker how this discretion affects legitimacy.

Faces o f Discretion
Discretion is inevitably tied up with matters o f decisionmaking (Manning,
1991), it is an “act o f choice” (Feldman, 1991; p . 167). We follow Feldman (1991) in
defining discretion “as the legitimate right to make choices based on one’s authoritative
assessment o f a situation. As such, discretion is an exercise o f authority” (Feldman,
1991; p. 164). Decisionmaking theories span the range o f fields o f endeavor we survey
in this project including social work (Rooney, 1992), anthropology (Bordieu, 1990),
communication (vanDijk 1994), law (Hawkins, 1991), philosophy (Broadie, 1994),
politics (Kymlicka, 1990), psychology (Fischoff, 1988) and sociology (Homans, 1987).
Two orientations can be delineated within decision theories; utilitarian or behavioral
modes (Fischoff, 1988) and what, for lack o f a better term, could be described as
evaluative modes (Frankfurt, 1988; Taylor, 1985). The behavioral/utilitarian modes
focus on things such as level o f certainty, “subjective expected utility,” and rationality
(Fischoflf, 1988; p. 154). Evaluative frames o f reference take into consideration more
than the value o f the outcome to individual interests, our certainty about having
considered all the options and whether or not our decisions were rational. This mode
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looks at the reality o f uncertainty, emotionality, and the locality and specificity of need
for the kinds o f evaluations that are made whether these are “strong” or “weak”
(Taylor, 1985; v. 1, p.33). These two strands o f decision theories may inscribe the
modem and postmodern discourses respectively in this aspect o f these issues.
The use o f discretion in decision making is as structured by rules as it is
functional between the delineations o f those rules (Baumgartner, 1991). Discretion
comes into play in the interpretation o f rules as well as in their exercise and this is the
location o f their arbitrariness. Discretion has been identified as an open area encircled
by a set o f restrictions (Schneider, 1991). Discretion is “subjective” justice where rules
are “formal.” Justice can be arbitrary, such as when not related to formal ends, and
power can be exercised illegitimately, even by legitimated decisionmakers, resulting in
potentially intrusive behavior by institutional authority (Baumgartner, 1991; Hawkins,
1991b). Discretion can operate in the choices between “courses o f action and inaction”
(Hawkins, 1991b). Much o f the policy making in bureaucratic structures is focused on
how decisionmakers structure future decisionmaking policy. Policy, in this sense, is the
set o f rules structuring the activity o f discretion itself (Hawkins, 1991b; p 28). What
happens to those who fall between the rules; the “hard cases” (Dworkin, 1985)? What
happens when individuals fall into the marginal areas?
Decision making by social workers is a critical part of social work practice.
Authority and discretion in decision making can easily be taken for granted by those
individuals endowed with their usages. A clear image o f what processes are at play
with these concepts can provide for a social worker taking into account the perspective
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o f the client population affected by the result o f the decisions made. Sometime the
bureaucracy constrains the social worker to being able to make only one kind of
decision in a given set o f circumstances. What reality is possibly missed by that
bureaucratic structure with regard to the effects of it’s policy enforcements by a social
worker, which, if recognized by the social worker, can be questioned and even changed
to eliminate an abusive type o f decision making policy? Can the social worker in the
situation advocate for the client population to help the bureaucracy change a policy
dictate that marginalizes an individual client or client population?

Margins/Marginalizations
Authority is a term occupying the “margin” between epistemology, ethics and
social power. It’s activity resides in the “intellectual space” (Bauman, 1993; p. 146)
that occupies the “between” o f these concepts. Another term occupying a “marginal”
location is “discretion” which operates in the “space between legal rules” (Hawkins,
1992; p. 11). It functions in the way of Heidegger’s “clearing” (Shatzki, 1992; p.81) for
assisting in understanding the workings o f authority and discretion. We use the term
“marginal” in Derrida’s (1982) sense because it conveys minutiae o f meaning not
available prior to it’s appearance. We use Derrida’s term marginal also because it
begets another o f his terms; “differance” which also applies to the relation that
“authority” has to epistemology and social power. “Differance” implies, for Derrida,
both a differentiation from and a deference for the closely associated other terms
(Derrida, 1982; p.8). We also use differance in it’s connection to margin in it’s
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activities of “movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation,
.. .referral, detour, postponement...” (Derrida, 1981; p. 8) because this kind of
movement describes the ways power “marginalizes” (Ferguson, 1990) as well as
privileging (Furr, 1995) certain individuals and groups. This marginal area where
power operates via authority or discretion through differance has remained mostly
unlocated and undescribed, though the activities of power and the ways power
marginalizes have been well described (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha & West, 1990). By
use o f this term we most accurately associate all three terms as they interact with each
other in our usage o f them in language.
So what is the point of delineating this marginal space? According to Ferguson
(1990), if power continues to work from this “hidden place” (Ferguson, 1990; p.9) then
it continues to operate as it currently does in it’s activities of marginalization and
oppression. Yet, it could become open to exposure and exploration if those structural
dynamics which keep it hidden are no longer in place (Bordieu, 1991). The concept of
the margin and the movement that takes place therein called differance also suggest for
Derrida a questioning o f the “authority o f presence” and of the “limits which constrain
us” (Derrida, 1982; p. 10). Although Derrida is speaking of language as Being this
questioning can also be applied to the language that conveys power. Bourdieu (1991)
holds that the domination language holds over us though it’s constructive capacity will
cease to do so only when this capacity is brought “to light” and “the intellectulist
philosophy which treats language as an object o f contemplation rather than an
instrument o f power . ..” acknowledges this (Bordieu, 1991; p.37). As long as power
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can operate invisibly, it can continue to operate indefinitely. When it can be questioned
at that choice point o f a discretionary decision, especially by a dynamic o f self
questioning, where it operates in the margin as discretion or authority, then it begins to
become visible and amenable to change. The affects o f shifting from a pattern of
relatively unreflective or akratic decision making, to a more reflective one can have an
impact on the whole system, whether intellectual or social, that this pattern operates
within.

Deconstruction and Marginal Terms
We will try to establish elements o f the “general system” (Gasche, 1987) that
will help establish the mobile contours or “ordered clusters of traits o f possibilities
which in one and the same movement constitute and reconstitute systems” (Gasche,
1987; p. 7). Here, at the “margins” of the interaction between social power and it’s
expressions in such outlets as social work practice or epistemology, exist the media for
use and misuse o f social power. At this juncture it is necessary to expand on Gasche s
notion o f the ‘general system’ and extend it to it’s potential parallel in social systems by
means o f the social theorist Niklas Luhmann. While Gashe’s analysis pertains primarily
to intellectual systems, the structure and dynamics described fit closely enough to
Luhmann’s social systems description to be functionally applicable. The social system
can be conceived o f as an “iteration that is not a reiteration” (Bauman, 1993; p. 103); a
habitus repeated on a macrosystemic scale. Luhmann’s (1995) Social Svstems
delineates a postmodern idea o f systematicity that retains the modem characteristic of
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universality. He describes a system concept which might provide a pattern for a nonabusive postmodern social power to operate through. It is a network o f separate but
interconnected relations that reflect postmodern “localist” views o f society. His system
exemplifies the notion o f systematicity and could be complimentary to a social work
frame o f reference. It combines the views of micro, meso and macrosytemic
perspectives into one simultaneously interactive view. Knodt’s (1995) succinct
description delineates his idea;
“Luhmarm lays out a theoretical groundwork which subsequently provides for a
description o f modem society as a complex system o f communications that has
differentiated itself horizontally into a network of interconnected social
subsystems. Each o f these subsystems reproduces itself recursively on the basis
o f it’s own, system specific operations. Each of them observes itself and it’s
environment, but whatever they observe is marked by their unique perspective,
by the selectivity o f the particular distinctions they use for observations. There
is no Archimedian point from which this network could be contained in an allembracing vision. And yet—and this is perhaps Luhmann’s most controversial
proposition—the theory o f social systems, like any “supertheory,” insists on the
universality o f it’s claims. This is not to say that the theory claims an exclusive
right to some ultimate, non-contingent truth, but that it must account for the
self-implicative nature o f it’s own observations: a general theory o f social
systems must deal with everything social, including itself as a contingent part of
the reality it describes. (Knodt, 1995; p.xii)
This concept o f the “margin,” then, becomes most important to tfiis endeavor as we
seek to establish that there are these points o f meeting between what is called “social
power” and what is called “epistemology” within and between these subsystems as well
as what is inside and outside o f these margins. In addition, it is important to the project
o f finding the location and characteristics o f the limitations social power and ethics
impose on each other. Derrida poses the issue: what “compels us to count in it’s [the
topic] margin more or less than one believes is said or read” ? (Derrida, 1982; p.xxiv).
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What parts o f our social power come from the knowledge base we have? What parts
o f the construction o f that initial knowledge base were founded on some individual’s or
group’s social power? It is at this point that the technique o f “deconstruction” comes
into play. The intent o f deconstruction is to bring ‘to light’ that which is hidden in the
presuppositions (hidden in the margins); for Derrida, the presuppositions o f literature
and philosophy, for us the presuppositions o f knowledge and what it enables power to
utilize. Our definition o f deconstruction derives from Rodolphe Gasche (1987)
Deconstruction must be understood, we contend, as the attempt to “account,”
in a certain
manner, for a heterogeneous variety or manifold o f non-logical
contradictions and discursive inequalities of all sorts that continues to haunt and
fissure even the most succes^il development of philosophical arguments and
their systematic exposition.... These dissimilarities are to be located, first, in
concept-formation; second, on the level o f strategies o f philosophical
argumentation; and third, on the level o f the textual arrangement and
disposition o f the different parts o f a philosophical work. (Gasche, 1987; p. 4)
Our usage o f the technical aspects of deconstruction will focus primarily on the first, to
a small extent on the second and not at all on the third modality described by Gasche.
Deconstruction takes up it’s task with the following premises; ( I) philosophic
concepts, while being separate necessarily from other concepts, embody values that are
in opposition o f sorts to other concepts with which they may be inextricably linked; (2)
different levels o r modalities o f concepts can self contradict as when a philosopher
argues in writing that writing is futile and speech is all (Gasche, 1987; p.4). Finally,
deconstruction is concerned with generation o f “minimal syntheses that regulate the
non-canonical and non-philosophical problems o f philosophical discourse...” (Gasche,
1987; pp.5-6). How frequently do we look for the logical inconsistencies in statements
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or practice decisions we make? How often do we make a different choice about the
statement or the decision once we notice the inconsistency when it means we will have
to do so in front o f our client or boss? How will it look for our authority if we do so?
How is it looked upon by our clients or our boss if we do so? In taking it to
Luhmann’s scale, how do the parts o f the system claim they work together and yet
refuse to monitor their activity? How is this refusal expressed? How does it act to
marginalize?

Reifying Terms?
“Reification” is, in philosophy, the “fallacy o f taking abstractions and regarding
them as actually existing entities that are causally efficacious and ontologically prior
and superior to their referents” (Angeles, 1981; p.243). Reification is also known as
the fallacy o f “misplaced concreteness” (ibid., p.243). Are the words we use to talk
about the things we talk about equivalent to the things themselves? Is the individual in
the culture different from our own a “savage” with only “prelogical mentality” (LevyBruhl, 1985)? Is Saddam Hussein the “ monster” the news media depicts him as or is
this only an “intentional characterization” (Livingston, 1996)? Is the “criminal” really
“culpable” for his crime or is his future now dimmed only by someone’s misguided
legal construction of his reality (Dworkin, 1985; p. 72; Simester & Smith, 1996; p.8).
Am ‘T ’ who I say I am or does my understanding o f myself so differ from your
understanding o f who I am that it creates a problem in some interpersonal setting
(Hyppolite, 1997)? Is an issue like the practice of “hazing” or sexual harassment in the
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military really against military code or does it only become so when it becomes
politically public (Zizek, 1997)? Is the new “chronic fatigue syndrome” a discovery or
is it the social construction o f a psychological entity that has plagued overworked
individuals from time immemorial (Jordan et al., 1997)? Do “classes” in society
actually have structures or are these structures only in the minds o f the observers doing
the research on them (Giddens, 1982)'’ In each case above, the label as referent is
applied to the individual and decisions are made based on the meaning o f the referent.
How do social policies marginalize through social construction, those populations that
are “margianlized” (Ferguson, 1990)? How is it that society can deny the generation o f
patterns o f dominance on the one hand and supply justifications for them on the other
hand (Hartsock, 1983)? These questions range from the extreme to the more subtle
and represent more the cross section of the diversity of the fields they come from than
any claim to complete representativness. They represent only a small sampling o f the
ways in which the objects of our study come under the influence o f individual social
constructions o f reality. They also may be taken to show how far social science
professionals have come in regards to self awareness of our own epistemic
ethnocentricity. We return to the question, how do our policies marginalize their
intended recipients? Does this occur through the process o f treating individuals as
equivalent to the labels they have accumulated?
Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) relates that “people want policy to be informed
and well analyzed, perhaps correct or scientific, yet they also want policy making to be
democratic and hence necessarily an exercise o f power” (Lindblom & Woodhouse,
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1993; p. 7). Throughout the process o f this activity, values come into focus. Which
labels come to have value? Whose values hold the upper hand in any given decision is
always a matter of what might be called a “discourse coalition” or some collective body
o f decision makers that hold to the same idea or “construct” (Hajer, 1993). As long as
an administrative bureaucratic body, such as our agency “auspices, holds a given
construct as primary (such as the medical model of client “pathology”) and hold the
keys to “manipulating the political power bases o f the organization in imposing that
knowledge...” (Hummel, 1994) the value structures will be slow to change. Until
organizations can implement within their structures ways to “constrain the inclination
and the capacity o f actors to optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests
are secured by prevailing rewards and sanctions.. . ” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) those
groups who are currently being marginalized through this reification process will
continue to be marginalized through this mode o f social power exercise.
Postmodern thinkers have been significant in creating new lenses through which
to see old structures o f interaction in which social power is functioning. The
dichotomies o f thinking established and maintained by some modem philosophical
categories kept the workings of social power “hidden” from view of those not
participating in this power usage. It is necessary to utilize these new lenses to locate
the ways in which misuses o f authority and discretion occur in order to have access to
challenge these misuses through the critical communicative approach. Social workers
are familiar with client populations o f individuals who have been “marginalized”
through race, gender or creed and will be able to utilize some of the postmodern lenses
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to enable themselves to “deconstruct” social power abuses and assist clients in
returning to self determining status.

Conceptualizing Social Power
So how is it that one individual or group of individuals become marginalized?
What necessarily must be the state o f affairs within which this occurs*’ We have stated
above that social power acts in a covert manner through discretional authority to
enforce this marginalizing tendency. Here, the arena o f social power we will be
concerned with is outlined concisely by A. I. Goldman (1972); “the domain o f power is
not confined to the political realm, narrowly conceived; employers have power over
employees, and teachers have power over students” (Goldman, 1972; p.221) as well.
While Goldman has outlined the broad contours of the field, or portion thereof we will
focus on, we will look to A. Kemohan (1989) for a description of some o f the forms
expressions o f social power takes. Following J. K. Galbraith, (1983) he classifies
power as;
condign power which includes physical force and negative sanction,
compensatory power, which includes inducement and incentive, and
conditioned power,. ..which not only affects the final outcome o f a person’s
choices, but also the process o f choosing itself the site of human agency.
(Kemohan, 1989; p. 712)
These forms o f expression of social power are interwoven through the o f theories of
social power we will overview. The survey we undertake will determine where each
theory grounds authority in some reference to knowledge.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

Thomas Wartenberg ( 1992) outlines a “situated concept of power” which
includes a model of a social field of interaction within which a social dyad functions.
His concept includes the peripheral social agents and their responses to the dyadic
agents as well as their power relation to each other. An example of this would be the
teacher-student dyadic structure which involves the teachers power to evaluate a
student and a peripheral social other’s use of the teacher’s evaluation o f the student to
empower or disempower the student as a result o f that evaluation. The focal point is a
“differential structure o f orientation” that the peripheral social agents use to empower
by alignment o f themselves with one or another o f the dyadic members. But whose
preferences are met by the student/teacher interaction? Is the teacher constrained by
social policy to act in the student’s favor or on his own?
One answer to this question can be clarified by an analysis of the field both
individuals are situated in. J.G. March (1988) claims there is a need to develop a
measurement o f comparison o f a field o f personal preferences which involves an
assessment o f the “value distances” between alternative outcomes of differential
interests o f given individuals being satisfied. There is an “intertemporal” element built
into consideration of the interests o f “future citizens” while considering those of
present citizens. These interests would constitute a field o f interests wherein political
action could be said to align with some interests while ignoring others. March calls this
“preference pooling” and goes on to say this locates “a preference center o f society
where those individuals with preferences close to the center would be said to have
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power while those individuals whose preferences are further from the center are
marginalized and disempowered (March, 1988; p.65).”
These preference centers are located, recognized and developed through
participation in “social processes of identity, learning and discussion”(ibid, p. 66).
Society, in the above example, privileges the student on the basis of the teacher’s
evaluation o f the student’s knowledge. But how does the individual utilize his own
sense o f identity in ways that accommodate both her own needs and those o f society*’
Does the person develop this identity in a way that would take both views into
perspective (Nagel, 1986) or does she only take her own perspective?
R. Lane (1988) delineates an “experiential” analysis o f power that provides a
subjective framework for the understanding o f power. In his theory, the “power
holder” seeks some “good” in society. This good becomes in some way “addictive” for
him. When decisional conflicts over “goods” come to the fore, say, through the
information that what is considered as an individual “good” is not viewed by society in
the same light, a dynamic called “post decisional dissonance reduction” occurs enabling
the individual to allay conflict by rationalizing previous choices. If control o f one’s
subordinates is a good to an employer, control can become addictive. Rather than
adjusting these expressions o f control upon information from other sources that use of
this control is excessive, the authority may simply justify future controlling behavior in
order to maximize his own sense o f good and reduce his dissonance.
In each o f these theories o f the dynamics of social power, authority was
associated with a reference to some authoritative position, whether this was an
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employment/educator position, a collective decision making body, or simply a
hedonistic preference, and the knowledge implied to be associated with that position.
Whose knowledge is privileged over that knowledge with which it competes? Whose
social power does one person think it politically feasible to align with over another
person? What level o f personal awareness does an individual actor make decisions
from?

Social Power and Authority
Above we have elaborated how decisional discretion could be associated with
and used either legitimately or illegitimately though authority in ambiguous or marginal
situations. Here the focus is narrows to treat authority more exclusively. At this point
we must attend to the caution o f Lukes (1977) position that power is an “essentially
contested concept” and merely draw some of the contours o f social power. Power is
attributed to individual actors in their interactions with other individual actors. Power
is attributed expression though direct and indirect modalities. Power affects cognitive
and behavioral capacities o f individuals. Power may be expressed intentionally and
unintentionally. Power is not limited to expression through interpersonal modes; it may
be embedded in infrastructures (Lukes, 1977).
Authority is associated with social power through a number o f different
perspectives Lukes (1990) calls (1) the “official” perspective, which includes State
distributed relations, (2) an “unofficial” perspective, which is associated with the day to
day administration o f organizational or auspices policies, (3) a position which is
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described as being between the aforementioned two perspectives which can be seen by
what is done rather than what is said will be done (Lukes, 1990; p.205). Those persons
in the positions viewed consensually to be associated with authority are accorded social
power.
R. B. Friedman (1990) describes the relationship between knowledge and
authority as expressed by one person who defers to another person because s\he “is
thought to have special knowledge” (Friedman, 1990; p.80) which is somehow not
available to others. He points out that the essential component o f this view is the
construance o f differential availability of knowledge within a group o f persons of
otherwise equal status. Something is construed by one individual (m) as being available
to this privileged other person (t) due to some characteristic of his/her personality that
potentiates to receipt of knowledge. It is the combination of this mysterious other
thing in the personality o f t with knowledge that requires that / be deferred to.
Lukes (1990) following Friedman, talks about consensus in this attribution of
authority to another. Consensus is found because the shared ground is in regard to
what constitutes authority as well as what constitutes knowledge; the knowledge and
authority privileged by a given discourse coalition. Also, through consensus in
maintenance o f the existing status quo, those whose interests are aligned with existing
preference pool stand to gain more by support rather than resistance o f such activity.
These frameworks are the dominant ideologies seen to be modem in character and
which are challenged by postmodern discourse.
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Postmodem Power?
We have modem and postmodern versions o f metaphysics, ethics and
epistemology but do we have a postmodern theory o f power? Both modernity and
postmodemity refer, usually in derogatory terms, to power and it’s effects, but they
both refer primarily to the same activities and usages o f power. While both
perspectives offer altematives to how what is currently understood as power is utilized,
neither offers a viable alternative to the power abuser for realizing his/her needs. Is
there an altemative existing? What would a postmodern theory o f power look like*’
What would be required o f the power abuser to shift from “abuse” in it’s definition of
misuse of discretionary authority for personal gain to activities that meet his/her needs
in non-abusive activities? Michel Foucault (1980) has made some suggestions;
Mahatma Gandhi (1950, 1957) and Paolo Freire (1970, 1994) embody the kind of
distributory framework that could be articulated into theory and practice. Although
Foucault’s theories are present in the public sphere as generators o f attention and
controversy, Foucault operated within French intellectual spheres and was not as
immediately faced by the realties of the kinds o f power Gandhi was and Friere were
faced with. How could there be a synthesis o f these modes of power that would be
accepted by one who currently abuses power? Is this even possible? Is it possible that
if this proposed synthesis were available (i.e. articulated to and within the public
sphere) that potential power abuses may be mitigated and detoured? Is it possible to
marginalize, in some distant future, even the abuse of power itself? Perhaps not, but to
move in that direction is necessary.
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Foucault’s (1982) conclusion is that “the political, ethical, social, philosophical
problem o f our day is not to try and liberate the individual from the state, and from the
states institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type o f
individualization which is linked to the state” ( p. 216). Foucault (1982) differentiates
between “power relations”, “relationships o f communication” and “objective
capacities” . Yet, he maintains, there are “blocks in which the adjustment o f abilities,
the resources o f communication and power relations constitute regulated and concerted
systems” ( p. 218). Power is manifest differently through these three aspects o f
interaction and is not preventative of consent between aspects. More directly, it is
“action upon actions o f others” (p.220). As such, it maintains the cognizance of
freedom as accounted to these acting agents. A situation where activity by one agent is
“determined” by another is not seen as a power relations. Foucault points the way to
balancing such relations. He outlines four aspects that must be considered, I ) “The
system o f differentiation” which facilitates action o f one agent on another including
class, economic, cultural and knowledge privileging distinctions; 2) “Types of
objectives”, those exercising power engage intentionally; 3) “The means o f bringing
power relations into being”, which are modes of knowledge, military forces, informal
political systems; 4) “Forms of institutionalization..” such as societal structures o f law
and observation and, 5) The degrees of rationalization...” it is elaborated, transformed,
organized; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the
situation” (p. 223-224). Using the frameworks Foucault has elaborated is it possible to
establish whether a specific context is imbalanced in one direction or another.
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Ideological constraints can be superseded, socialization can be restructured and
interpersonal activities modified.
Gandhi believed in the ability o f men as individuals to see a set o f options once
they w ere made available and choose from among them the one which followed most
closely to a path o f Truth. Gandhi's work as a Barrister in England led to his standing
up for the rights o f individuals and collective bodies o f persons in India and Africa in an
effort to balance unequal power relations between individuals and between individuals
and governments. Gandhi (1957) described events he was involved in as well as
circumstances surrounding them for the individuals that were affected by these events
including those institutions responsible for the situations coming about and in order to
make his actions within those situations intelligible to those he opposed. His final
effect was to balance power relations between two groups o f individuals in an
oppressive relationship. Michel Foucault’s (1972) view o f power relationships is
embodied in and by a distribution o f knowledge through discourse in a network
structure and presents us with an engaged mode o f power relations; discourse requires
that there be an exchange between at least two persons, each view being accorded
equal validity, not a disengaging, distancing mode as that which operates in oppressive
as well as other relationships. Gandhi worked for just such mode of balancing power
through the activity o f education; both of individuals and groups.
The method Freire (1970) describes, that he uses in South American
communities, parallels Gandhi's activity in India. Freire begins his educative process by
exploring the worldviews o f his students directly.
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The investigation o f what I have termed the people's thematic universe" - the
complex of their "generative themes"- inaugurates the dialogue of education ...
the methodology o f that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the
opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's
awareness in regard to these themes... the object o f the investigation is not
■persons...but rather the thought language with which men and women refer to
reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world
within which their generative themes are found, (p.78)
This paragraph sums up all the basic attributes which I think can be applied to social
work settings to ensure power abuses do not occur. When these settings are
approached through an understanding of Foucault's revision o f power relations, and
Gandhi’s example of activist conflict resolution we may find increased effectiveness in
dealing with power abuses. By bringing these three perspectives together we move in
the direction o f integration o f theory and practice so necessary to social work (Tucker,
Garvin & Sarri, 1997) that could be considered in formulation of a model for individual
praxis which prioritizes balancing power relations.
Social power is a major factor in the person-environment equation affecting the
practice o f contemporary social workers. Social power, as a resource, is a factor of
existence many o f the individuals, with which social workers meet daily, find lacking in
their lives. Frequently, these individuals have only experienced the negative outcomes
o f social power. Knowing the functioning of existing conceptualizations of systems of
social power, as well as potential altematives, can aid social workers in recognizing and
correcting abuses through creative restmcturing o f conceptualization which may later
become functional systems themselves.
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To revisit the abused woman above; consider the possibility that she has just left
the abusive situation with her children due to the abuse she was receiving. She then
files for divorces and requests compensation, say, child support, that is legally hers, but
she has no job skills because her abuser has not allowed her to work. The abuser,
being the wage earner, has access to an attorney and through this attorney, convinces
the court that she is an unfit mother and that he should have the children. This is not
because he wants them but because it is another way to attack her. The court does not
see the latter (it is not a “visible” power abuse) but grants the abuser his petition on the
“facts.”
It is necessary to in some way describe the diflferent potential manifestations o f
the uses and abuses o f social power to work toward making the specifics o f the
dynamics described above open to question. When these dynamics can be opened to
question they can then provide a “clearing” or social workers to advocate in new ways
to assist clients in managing the potential negative experiences o f social power abuses.
Seeing how authority and discretion come together in a technically just but practically
destructive (in this case for the mother and her children) manner provide the impetus to
move toward advocacy that would provide information to the legitimate authority and
end the potential for occurrence of the sort of abuse described above.
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SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

This final section weaves together (hopefully) the strands developed in part
above. It begins by delineating a notion of the “public sphere" derived primarily from
Jurgen Habermas ( 1984. 1987.1989. 1993) and commentators on his work on the
public sphere (Benhabib. 1992; Calhoun. 1992) supplemented by other perspectives
(Bauman. 1993; LeFebvre. 1991). A notion of social work’s public sphere will be
differentiated from the notions about the general public sphere through descri%)tions of
the relative activities (Calhoun. 1992; Benhabib. 1992; Wamke. 1995) that social
work is concerned with in a public sphere. Then follows a description of activities
more closely associated with a “communication community” (Apel. 1980) and the
kinds of “discourse analysis” that could take place there (Bordieu. 1991; Calhoun.
1995; Dunn. 1993; Fraser. 1992 McCarthy. 1992). How the themes described above
from metaphysics and ethics combine to produce epistemological discourse within a
social work communication community will be discussed.
Next, in the section on epistemology. will follow a description of the
characteristics of that communication community. Above a communication
community has been designated that consists of representatives of the fields of
anthropology, communication, law. philosophy, politics, psychology, and sociology.
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As the philosophical themes of modemity/postmodemity have been discussed above,
no further analysis of this field will occur here. Those perspectives will continue to
provide critical frameworks o f the other fields. The issue of “pluralism" (Rescher.
1993) and how it would effect consideration of input from other fields will be
discussed. A limited selection of the literature from each of these fields will be
surveyed to determine the ways these fields express the themes of power and ethics.
The meeting places of these two perspectives will be explored with regard to
constructs o f immediate interest to social work. An attempt will be made to delineate
which types o f discourses are privileged within these fields in order to clarify what
kinds of themes affect social work practice.
Finally, in the last section on social work and social power we will pursue a
course of social work “discourse ethics” and attempt to describe this course from a
number of different perspectives including but not limited to Habermas. ( 1990. 1993).
Apel. ( 1980). Honneth. ( 1995). We will attempt to integrate this discourse ethics with
Schon’s ( 1983) framework of a “reflective practitioner” and Nielson's ( 1996) “politics
of ethics” as they apply within organizational structures such as those encountered in
social work relationships. We will use the work of Robert Kegan ( 1982. 1994) to
delineate the issues associated with the evolution of moral judgement of a reflective
practitioner as s/he generates knowledge for social work practice. Different levels of
the issues which social workers and their clientele are affected by and which they
affect with everyday decisions will be explored.
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Social W ork In the Public Sphere
Lefebvre ( 1991 ) points to the necessity to define the notions o f space we seek
to put into use. Above we have delineated that space called the “margin” by Derrida
(1982) in order to put it to use in our descriptions of the location o f the meeting o f
power and ethics. That space above had the nature of the Heidegerean “clearing” or
that “space or realm o f illumination in whose light things can show or manifest
themselves to people ...” (Schatzki, 1992; p.81). And yet even when things become
clear, decisions must be made in the moment by a decision maker. This idea o f the
“public sphere” we will develop will function in a similar way to allow a location o f
“clarity” to arise. Lefebvre designates a “social space” that “is not a thing among other
things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced and
encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity” and yet it
“permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.
Social space implies a great diversity o f knowledge” (Lefebvre, 1991; p.73). Bauman
(1993) says this social space encompasses “a complex interaction o f three interwoven,
yet distinct, processes - those o f cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings - and their
respective products” (p. 145). Each o f these spaces is “constructed” differently; the
cognitive through “acquisition and distribution of knowledge;” the aesthetic through
“affective” considerations; and the moral through a “distribution o f felt/assumed
responsibility” (p. 146). The public space to be designated here will not be so wide in
scope as that described by LeFebvre but will certainly include the diversity of
knowledge he mentions and some o f those elements outlined by Bauman. Calhoun’s
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(1992) synopsis o f Habermas (1989) The Structural Transformation o f the Public
Sphere will be utilized in the description that follows unless otherwise noted. This
public sphere was originally a masculine gendered, primarily political space wherein
individuals from the “educated, propertied” population carried on “discourse” which
excluded less fortunate others as well as their interests. This sphere gradually
expanded to include both a wider range of interests and non-elite classes o f individuals
into the discourse. Habermas saw the main importance of this public sphere in it’s
ability to provide a location for social integration o f “rational-critical discourse” which
was separate from the “state” interests as well as from the “private realm” o f the family.
It became the location to bring into recognition the interests o f “organizations created
for sustaining life” as matters for “public discussion” (Calhoun, 1992; pp. 1-16). At it’s
height, it included four significant elements: (I) that members not only not worry about
equality o f status but “disregarded status altogether....” (2) the discussion included the
“problematization” o f issues that had remained previously unquestioned, (3) it included
among it’s ranks any o f those individuals who had access to reading materials, could
formulate and express opinions on the specific topics of interest and (4) it established
itself as “accessible” to potentially all of the public individuals (Habermas, 1989: p. 3638). Benhabib (1992) outlines elements o f two other models o f the public sphere
which she contrasts with Habermas’ model and which will be o f interest to our project.
She maintains that all o f these spaces “become sites o f power, o f common action
coordinated through speech and persuasion” (Benhabib, 1992; p 78). She notes that
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even the topics included in the discourse are matters decided by power. Lyotard,
(1988) has pointed out that discourse o f some communication communities can be seen
even to structure the topics in terms such that dissenting views have no way to argue
about the differences (Lyotard, 1988; pxii). The ways to define or “predefine”
(Benhabib, 1992) differences are eliminated by the linguistic rule structures generated
and perpetuated by the “habitus” (Bordieu, 1980, 1991) dominant in power. She
maintains that the content of the discourse in not as important as the means to go about
the arguing. What is necessary is “reflexive questioning o f issues by all those affected
by their foreseeable consequences and the recognition o f their right to do so (Benhabib,
1992; p 81). Fraser (1992) relates that this public sphere was conceptualized as one
mode o f brining the state to account for it’s actions before the citizenry. She relates
that though this was the ideal, the reality was that the public sphere described by
Habermas was gendered in it’s self formulations and much more exclusive than the
ideal. Fraser would seek to redefine what was considered “public” as inscribing
marginalizing tendencies built into the ideology of a “bourgeois, masculinist
conception” o f the public (Fraser, 1992). Fraser acknowledges that while the ideal
openness has not occurred thus far, it remains a potential for a pluralized community o f
“subaltern counterpublics” including “discursive arenas where members of subordinated
social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional
interpretations o f their identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1992, p. 123). Bordieu
(1991) describes how the power of domination is inscribed within the language used to
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carry on discursive relations and that the only way to make these dominating practicing
visible is by “bringing to light the operations o f object construction” that are
perpetuated linguistically (Bordieu, 1991; p.38). Social workers engaged in generation
o f practice wisdom for inclusion in the public sphere can establish a sort o f self
reflexive communication community to work towards this.

Social W ork’s Communication Community
How could a public sphere composed o f a social work “communication
community” contribute to this endeavor? How can social workers act as advocates of
“subaltern” publics in the process of our generation o f knowledge and practice wisdom
that become a recognized part o f an argument or discourse in the public sphere? KarlOtto Apel (1980) holds that there is a “transcendental” groundwork for the very form
defined as “argument” that presupposes a “communication community” that
understands it’s premises. He fitrther holds that argumentative actions as such are not
discernible outside o f the possibility that their teleological ends could not be evaluated
by those who observed them. His “transcendental” groundwork would frame the
activity o f argumentation or discourse, but not the constructs argued. Therefore, that
action o f evaluation, or the inscription of “values” into the “subjective-intersubjective”
space between individuals is, in Derrida’s terms “always already” (Spivak 1976) present
in the action o f argumentation (Apel, 1980; pp. 142-144). What kind o f values can we
recognize in the discourse o f the communication community? Apel (1980) argues for a
“universal ethics” on which to ground this discourse for needs that inevitably face
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mankind. McCarthy (1992) relates that even these needs themselves are structured by
the contemporary values o f given cultures. Ideally, he says, discourse in the public
sphere will accord different interests similar accord in discussion and he goes on to
designate the requirement to differentiate what constitutes general need from
“subcultural” needs relative to definitions o f the “good life” or what M. Nussbaum
(1993) calls the “quality of life”. Discourse will allow questions o f general needs
(values) to remain open to discussion and the language these issues are discussed in
open to revision. The result will be that individuals “adopt a reflective attitude toward
their own expressive manifestations” (McCarthy, 1992; p. 56) in order to become
clearer about what their own values are and what decisions are made deriving from
these values. McCarthy describes a “web o f informal communication” (p. 59) that
organizes itself around mutual interests in order to address the problem of
dissemination o f values relevant to society into the public sphere for further decision
making to take place. This formulation parallels Hajer’s (1993) idea o f a “discourse
coalition” which is “basically a group of actors who share a social construct” (p.45)
which they further bring to a wider populace through a number o f means including
“debate and persuasion” (Hajer, 1993; p.48). These constructs arise within specific
contexts and are comprised of “ideas, concepts and categories” through which they
organize their discourse. These are the ways that social artifacts o f whatever
formulation are socially constructed whether this be through knowledge dissemination
in educational curricula, published books and periodicals, or reference materials used
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for projects such as this thesis. These social constructs or artifacts are embedded in the
unspecified positions that the researchers assume when generating their research. O f
primary importance to social workers is to recognize that when making our daily
practice or research decisions, we must be aware what presuppositions are present and
make these explicit minimally to ourselves, maximally to the populations we serve. In
order to do this we must identify these presuppositions in social work research
resources and recognize what forms they may take.

Sources o f Social Work Knowledge
Social work literature calls for an examination of research practices and the
inputs to these research practices (Laird, 1995), as well as for an examination o f
privileging procedures for the inputs to these practices (Furr, 1995; Tucker, 1996). A
renewed attention is called to “boundaries;” sometimes to reassert the boundaries
between social work and other disciplines (Abbott, 1995) and sometimes to relax those
boundaries (Imbrogno, 1996; Laird, 1995; Tucker, Garvin and Sarri, 1997). We are
reminded, as social workers, to be aware o f how we are affected by power
(Pinderhughes, 1983, 1996) and to “reflect on knowing oneself ethically” (Abramson,
1996; p. 195). The “epistemological subsystem” (comprised of all the inputs to
“practice wisdom”) o f social work practice knowledge inputs interrelates with the
“ideological subsystem” (which includes values, beliefs and attitudes) to affect decision
making about specific practice decisions (Souflee, 1993; pp.317-330). One way of
beginning to address these concerns is to determine first some o f the fields that are
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drawn upon to influence social work’s values, beliefs and attitudes. The section begins
with a review o f the social work literature drawn from different social work
specializations to determine the range of issues social work literature drawing on each
of the separate fields explores. Very few articles were found to be exclusively
dedicated to any one field o f endeavor outside o f social work. A review o f some o f the
themes articles drawing on specific fields outside o f social work speak about follows.
The scope o f this project does not allow for more than a representative sampling of
social work periodical literature from which to draw for the purposes o f this study.
Here focus is on the themes described above as relevant to social work endeavors.
Among the many issues that social workers draw upon anthropological
scholarship for is the aspect o f cultural input into “meaning-making” (Pozatek, 1994).
Though Western culture has it’s sources o f non-analytical meaning making, much of
the current academic research in meaning making takes an analytical tone (Stich &
Warfield, 1994). Social workers must be aware that other systems of meaning-making
have greater value in cultures dissimilar to our own. Another issue o f import is the
issue o f “ethnic sensitivity” (Schlesinger, & Devore, 1995) which calls on social
workers to be aware, through knowledge of a given culture, (Drower, 1996; Spencer &
Markstrom-Adams, 1990) what kinds of values exist as values in that culture. Finally,
while we look outside o f our own culture when we think o f anthropological studies, we
have certain segments o f the population, such as the gang culture (Molidor, 1996;
Jankowski, 1991) or the homeless (Blau, 1992; Marin & Vacha, 1994) within our
culture that represent separate cultures.
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Communication theory offers social work a wealth of theoretical knowledge to
build on and make daily practice interventions (Nelson, 1984). Bateson (1972) from
whom so many family therapy systems are derived, focused primarily on
communications. Strategies for interacting with various client populations (Rooney,
1992) rely on basic communication styles seeking to promote rapport, rather than
curtail it, in the face o f values differences between clients and social workers. Decision
making at community organizing meeting utilize communication strategies in order to
get their information out and attain the highest level o f integration o f this information
(Tropman & Momingstar, 1995).
Legal issues involving social workers include a recognized need to integrate
“legal issues” into the education curricula for social work graduate programs (Kopels
& Gustavsson, 1996) so that social workers will understand the processes o f legal
reasoning. This addition will benefit not only social work practitioners but their
clientele. Additionally, social workers would be well advised to have a greater
understanding o f their potential liabilities relative to practice decisions (Gelman,
Pollack & Auerbach, 1996; Reamer, 1994). These practice issues range from
confidentiality issues (Alexander, 1997) of clients involving agency, court system or
private practice to misconduct issues (Jayarante, Croxton & Mattison 1997).
Currently, philosophy’s primary input into social work processes come in the
form o f the aspects o f the modemity/postmdemity debate (Humphries, 1997; Smith &
White, 1997) delineated above. Issues of power use and abuse, also delineated above,
are matters o f concern (Hartman 1992; Pinderhughes, 1997). Critical theory, in the
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form o f Habermas’ ideas, also are represented in social work arenas (Dean & Fenby,
1989; Kondrat, 1995).
Politics (the general category is used rather than “political philosophy,”
“political science,” or “political theory” for simplicity’s sake) offers a number of
different dimensions that are important. Some o f the issues generated in the political
arena are more encompassing in their effects on social workers and their client
populations than all the other potential inputs mentioned above (Fisher, 1995). The
movements o f social policy within the houses o f government are determiners o f where
social workers can or cannot be enabled to provide for the welfare individual members
o f populations they serve (Barber, 1995; Gibson, 1997; LeGrand, 1997). Issues of
public opinion frequently run congressional / senatorial policy making procedures
(Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993) and result in shifts o f attitude with widespread
political effect. Designations of “race,” “welfare” or “federal responsibility” are social
constructions affected by research, public opinion, and power issues (Ewalt, 1996;
Latting, 1990; Morris, 1993).
Psychology has by far the most voluminous input to social work literature. As
psychotherapy in some form or another comprises a substantial part o f social work
practice, much information is drawn from this field to apply to human behavioral
understanding from the intersubjecive (Chescheir, 1995; Saari, 1995) to the
interpersonal (Germain, 1994). Concerns are present about how practitioners and
families construct their interpretations o f the pathologies o f those they interact with
(Cutler, 1991; Mattiani & Kirk 1991; Raffoul & Holmes, 1986; Saari 1992). As
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psychology is as young a “science” as social work and new formulations o f “pathology”
and “causes” o f illness incessantly change with new discoveries this is problematic area.
Sociology is the last main input to social work research that will be treated
here. It is the primary source of the views about social construction (Goldstein, 1990)
though many of these “constructivist” social workers look to the secondary sources for
their ideas o f social construction (Berlin, 1996; Franklin & Jordan, 1995; Granvold,
1996). These constructivist perspectives are concerned with the issues o f assessment
(Franklin & Jordan, 1995) meaning (Berlin, 1996), psychotherapy (Granvold, 1996),
and designations o f strength or pathology (Goldstein, 1990). In addition, concerns
about what constitutes a family (Berlin, 1996; Weik & Saleeby, 1995) are addressed.
Analyses o f the development o f “practice wisdom” (DeRoos, 1990; Klein & Blom,
1995) and knowledge construction process are also in the forefront.
Descriptions have been given above about how general social power dynamics
interact with discretionary use o f sanctioned and unsanctioned authority in spheres
outside of social work. Organizational dynamics obtain within milieu including
academic, corporate, social scientific and non-social scientific settings. While
separation between academic and organizational interests are maintained almost as
religiously as the separation o f church and state, influences still exist. The focus here is
for social workers to keep all o f these dynamics in view along with their affective costs,
while making decisions about knowledge generation. Social workers can be part o f a
new forging of power relations through their modes of knowledge generation in the
public sphere.
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Social work and Epistemology
One of the characteristics of power abuse is that it would seek to draw things to
itself and distribute nothing. Therefore, one o f the ways to immediately shift this
imbalancing will be to focus on redistributing that resource which is abused most by
power; information (Bordieu, 1991; Mohan, 1996). One of the ways this may be done
is to adopt a more “pluralistic” position with regard to what is acknowledged as valid
input within a public sphere or communication community (Rescher, 1993). Social
workers can allow for differences (Fraser, 1990; Lyotard, 1988; Fraser, 1990; Lyotard,
1988; Young, 1990) to be recognized and accommodated instead of marginalizing.
The position taken here is that as social work tends to draw on a number o f fields for
input to research/ knowledge construction (Mohan, 1996; Tucker, Garvin & Sarri,
1997), it will be beneficial for social workers to know how the groundwork o f
philosophy outlined above as the modernity/ postmodemity debate, metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics interact with conditions of power use or abuse. While
Habermas ( 1990) looks to consensus within the communication community in order for
there to be “rational” discourse , Rescher (1993) describes some o f what he sees to be
the problems with the practicality of this view. He maintains that rational consensus
requires of the collective o f individuals that they all think about the same things in the
same way given the evidence at their current disposal. The consensual view, he says,
also requires an intersubjective objectivity that would be difficult to attain (Rescher,
1993; p.51). He holds that individual’s decision making strategies are based on their
integration o f incoming information and aligning their views to accommodate this
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incoming information with preexisting experience. He maintains that the results are not
based on “intersubjectively invariant factors, but emerge from the reactions o f
individual agents proceeding on the basis o f their personalized... backgrounds o f
experience” (Rescher, 1993; p.66). Rescher relates the idea that just as it is
unreasonable to require a universal frame o f reference for all individuals to ground a
“discourse ethics” neither is it reasonable to expect a universal frame o f reference for
cross-disciplinary values and attitudes even (or especially) with regard to issues like
power and ethics. Though Rescher’s cautions are valuable to heed, regarding content
o f information, it is Habermas’ and Apel’s positions on the framework for
argumentative form consensus that will be aligned with here.

Authority and Values in Social Work Practice
A survey o f brief selections from the literatures of the separate fields used as
inputs to social w ork knowledge bases serves to convey a sense o f the relative
directions themes take regarding topics o f interest to social work. These will be the
issues of power and ethics as they affect metaphysical (such as “minds & the mental”,
“norms and values” or “free will”) or epistemological issues (such as “justification,”
“beliefs” or “truth”) outlined above.
Among other issues, anthropology addresses that of “viewpoint” (Shokeid,
1997) including views o f “self’ as it touches both field researcher (Wilson, 1988) and
“the native’s point o f view” (Geertz, 1984; Jones, 1970). Whose viewpoint must be
the one taken with regard to what is “published” about the particular “culture” in
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question (Shokeid, 1997; Schweder, 1984; Wilson, 1988), the interviewer’s or the
interviewee’s? Questions arise concerning how one justifies one’s own “belief’ about
what is “true” for human beings across cultures (Bordieu, 1977, Mitchell, 1988;
Schweder, 1984) relative to that of the individual within the culture one is studying.
Interviews and the use the confidentiality extended to one (by individuals who were
non-attendant to a “participant-observer” status o f their interviewer) within the course
o f the interviews one does to get information for ones research purposes (Mitchell,
1988; Jones, 1970; Wilson, 1988) become a concern.
Communication spans a number o f applicable media relative to how power and
ethics interact. Similar, and in connection to, the issue of perspective in anthropology,
one theme centers on the issue of “whose voice gets heard” (Ellsworth, 1989;
Hubbach, 1989; Krippendorf, 1995; Tannen, 1995)? Tannen describes the ways that
“linguistic style” privileges masculine self-referential communication styles over
feminine associate-inclusive communication styles as the norm for organizational
discourse (Tannen, 1995). Ellsworth relates that even the “pedagogy of
empowerment” can still marginalize for race and gender (Ellsworth, 1989). Whose
voices are represented in the “mass media” (Ferre, 1990; Self & Self, 1994; Thompson,
1994) and whose are silenced? Self & Self ( 1994) describe how computer software in
multicultural settings privilege the perspectives o f one culture (ours, where the
software was designed) over others in such things as “default language,” iconic
referents, and computer keyboard labeling (Self & Self, 1994).
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Legal theory, among other issues, is concerned with aspects of norms (Fegan,
1996; Salter, 1997), justifications of norms & values (Priban, 1997), abuses o f
discretion (Nelken, & Levi, 1996), and social constructions of the “criminal” (Collier,
1997; Simester & Smith, 1996), the family (Diduck, 1995), communities (Abel, 1995;
Collier, 1997), and discourse about the justice o f theses issues (Chesterman, 1997;
Priban, 1997; Salter, 1997). Norms here are designated in the guise o f the “external
conduct o f individuals” (Salter, 1997) and therefore can be utilized by administrative
bodies to marginalize individuals and communities who do not match some template
(Abel, 1995). This justification of norms come through the “legislative process”
(Salter, 1997) which assigns a value o f “true” (Priban, 1997) to the position backing it.
This power position must be questioned through an “interrogation o f justice”
(Chesterman, 1997) about it’s validity (Duff, 1996) and about it’s labeling “criminals”
as “culpable” or not (Dworkin, 1985; Simester & Smith, 1996).
Political concerns focus on arguments about “notions of the common good”
(Blitz, 1996; Palaver, 1995), “civic consciousness” and “free will” (Sandoz, 1996),
ideologies and power (Weiss, 1997; Zizek, 1997) uses o f authority (Durrheim, 1997;
Winant, 1997). In addition political foci are global (Kaarbo, 1997; Weiss, 1997)
national (Hanus, 1996; Rosati & Creed, 1997) or more individual (Zizek, 1997) in
focus. Notions o f “the common good” are tied up with facets of, again, perspective
(Palaver, 1995); whether it be an individual perspective or that of the collective in
communities (Blitz, 1996; Dirrheim, 1997; Nagel, 1991) or with superpowers (Rosati
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& Creed, 1997; Weiss, 1997). By whose authority does some “good” become
“common” and how is this “truth” (Durrheim, 1997 determined?
Psychology addresses a manifold o f issues including values (Schwartz, 1990),
and pathology as a “value” (Wakefield, 1992). Social constructivist viewpoints are
reflected in “constructivist psychotherapies” ( Neimeyer, 1993), family “realities”
(Hoffman, 1990), and “possible selves” (Markus & Nurius, 1986) to name just a few.
The construction o f selves, from psychology’s perspective, has to integrate
experimental vs. experiential perspectives (Jennings, 1986), temporal locations (i.e.
memories, immediate statuses, projected futures) and shifts across these locations
(Markus & Nurse, 1986). Included are “postmodern” identities (Smith, 1994) as well
as what is of value to these selves (Schwartz, 1986). Is the pathology attributed to a
loved one (or to oneself) the function of a societal “value” about “stigmatize[d] socially
undesirable behavior that is not really disordered” (Wakefield, 1992; p.3 73)? Persons
(1986) notes the necessity to study the actually occurring process “rather than the
psychiatric diagnosis” (Persons, 1986; p. 1252).
Sociological concerns include issues of revisioning self concepts (Mohan, 1996;
Van Kreiken, 1997), ethnocentric privileging o f one cultural form o f norms over
another (Mohan, 1996, 1997; Ramakrishnan & Balgopal, 1994). Challenges to state
authority include those o f postmodernist research (Banks & Mangan, 1995; Leonard,
1996),and class and race (Fegan & Vera, 1994; Marshall & Swift, 1993; Mohan,
1997). Revisioning the self, for Mohan (1996), means looking at alternatives to the
Freudian frames o f reference that have come to obfuscate the senses meaning o f the
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new self (Mohan, 1996) and, for Van Kreiken (1997), taking a longer temporal view
relative to self-construction (Van Kreiken, 1997). Ideas about class and racism include
exploding the “melting pot” myth of American government as well as “racist rituals”
(Fegan & Vera, 1994). In addition, the discussions o f the view o f class as the “unequal
distribution of power and advantage” (Marshall & Swift, 1993; p. 190).
Each o f the fields surveyed above have their own sets o f “values” and theses
values are expressed in the themes and concepts utilized by the individual authors o f
their generation o f field specific knowledge bases. Many o f the values present in the
frameworks of these fields overlap with or are equivalent to social work values. Some,
however, may not be. Some “traditional” values in theses other fields may not be
questioned by those individuals who generate research. Social workers are called upon
to engage in this critical questioning process themselves when utilizing this research for
social work purposes. It is positive for the field o f social work for there to be input
from other social science fields (Tucker, Garvin & Sari, 1997). Yet close attention
must be paid to which values are seen as “authoritative” in these other fields.

Authority, Discretion, Privileging and
Social Construction o f Knowledge
Each o f the above descriptions contributes to the intellectual diversity o f social
work practice wisdom through their slightly different perspectives on each o f the topics
o f interest explored. As with a “treatment team” or “ enhanced collaborative
approach” (Guttierez, GlenMaye, & DeLois, 1995; p.254), to social work practice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106

activity, the combinations o f perspectives allows a fuller picture of the construct
discussed. The theme we pursue next concentrates on how an imbalance can begin to
occur structurally. Social workers are familiar with components o f “traditional”
knowledge construction, including references to the previous individuals that have
formulated the “facts,” statements, and propositions that have gone into this theory
building. This is a requirement o f contemporary research; backing up one’s statements
with references to “authorities.” This brings us to the question “what privileges the
knowledge o f the references that these authors use to validate their statements (Furr,
1995)? (What privileges the references I use to validate or provide evidence for my
statements? Where do my references or their references get their authority?)
Hopefully, social workers can create for themselves the ability to look at the issue
under scrutiny from enough different perspectives to see the myriad of values that
attach to that issue from the different perspectives. From this wider view then the
individual social worker can determine which values s/he can identify as being aligned
with individual and social work values.
Do authors get authority or value simply from having published within a field
already (Tucker, 1996) or from publishing within their own field or “tu rf’ (Abbott,
1995)? Do they get this authority simply by being an author (Derrida, 1982)? Do
authors get their authority from the number of other authors that refer to them in other
texts (Merton, 1988)? There is an element of consensuality here, a sort of
“communicative rationality,” that frequently is identified as “instrumental rationality”
(Chriss, 1995; p. 548) but which can be taken as consensuality of a communication
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community active in the public sphere. The public sphere generates, through
consensuality, authority that acts within the margin between social power and
knowledge (Bordieu, 1991; p.5). Authority, as described above, is inextricably bound
up between the notions o f epistemology and social power (Friedman, 1990). Merton
(1988) talks about the “Matthew effect” wherein the first author of a multiply authored
work, or sometimes simply the previously published author, is remembered and quoted
while the subsequent authors are forgotten (Merton, 1988; p.319-320). This effect
shows a selective inattention to detail which can in some instances act to marginalize.
The call for reflexive activity regarding issues such as attribution of authority comes
from within each field surveyed here; social work (Abramson, 1996; White, 1997),
anthropology (Wilson, 1988), communication (Ellsworth, 1989; Ferre, 1990), law
(Fegan, 1996), politics (Winant, 1997), psychology (Hoffman, 1990; Kraus & Fussell,
1990) and sociology (Bordieu, 1990).
So what would a “discourse ethics” that took into consideration the plurality
and diversity o f the above range of fields and perspectives acting in the public sphere
look like? To begin to sketch an outline of this process, Habermas’ (1990) formulation
is instructive. Habermas begins his account with a consideration o f resentment as an
individual’s emotional response to a wrong done as an example o f a moral
consciousness. The point Habermas makes is that the shift in appraisal by the
individual of his/her emotional state from second person experiencing to third person
evaluating results in a shift in perspective widening the perception o f moral/ethical
constituents o f the interaction. According to McCarthy (1978) norms, “rationality
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and... maxims o f action cannot be decided upon monologically-within the horizon o f the
solitary, reflecting moral consciousness. ..” (McCarthy, 1978; p. 326). The shift in
perspective allows one to move to an interactive position within the situation.
Habermas then moves on to explain how this scenario is applied in communicative
action by showing that the “web o f moral feelings that [are] embedded in everyday life”
(Habermas, 1990; p. 50) serve as a an anchoring point that highlight the validity o f the
sense o f communicative ethical action between individuals. He holds that normative
claims to communicative action are based on what K.-O. Apel (1980) called the
recognition o f a transcendent form o f argumentation legitimated universally by
language users. The attempt to resolve conflict morally involves “an intersubjective
process o f reaching understanding [that] can produce an agreement that is reflexive in
nature; only it can give participants the knowledge that they have collectively become
convinced o f something” (Habermas, 1990; p. 67). Habermas maintains that needs and
values are socially, culturally constructed and revision must come through
consensuality within a “horizon provided by the lifeworld o f a specific social group
[with] real conflicts in a concrete situation which the actors consider it incumbent upon
them to reach a consensual means o f regulating some controversial social matter”
(Habermas, 1990; p . 103). Expanding on Habermas’ ideas, Honneth (1995) relates that
ethics cannot prescribe values in contemporary society “but can only provide a specific
procedure for conflict resolution; and in order for it in turn to be able to satisfy moral
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daims, this procedure must give expression to the substantive conviction that all human
beings have to respect one another as free and equal persons” (Honneth, 1995 p. 295).
When generating a piece o f research for publication in the field, the social
worker enters this communication community with her/his ideas and can then hope to
elicit commentary on the position presented. When this occurs in a communicative,
interactive field where critical perspectives can be exchanged, participants benefit, ideas
are clarified and the best possible resolution of conflicts can potentially occur. During
the process o f selection o f materials for inclusion in the research generated, a similar
dynamic can potentially occur. Through the activity of taking different value
perspectives on the subject, a dialogue o f sorts occurs and can provide the individual
social worker with more information about personal values and where these values
align with client well being and social work value positions. It is in this place that the
social w orker begins the reflexive process of social work in eliminating social power
abuses.

Social W ork and Social Pow er
The question contemporary social workers face is how to move into practice
and research activities given these changing conditions o f social discourse from a
position o f politicly (in it’s definition o f “prudential or not impulsive” (Oxford English
Dictionary [O.E.D.], 1924) oriented interactivity with the social environment which
moves towards social w ork’s long term goals of self- and other-empowerment and
balancing power. Here we will outline one approach which may address this concern.
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Donald Schon (1983) sets out a framework for reflective practice and this framework
will be woven into the fabrics of the discussion here. Next, we will delineate, from
Richard Neilson’s (1996) work on “the politics of ethics” the meeting places, or the
forms o f the meeting places between power usage/abuse and ethical programs. We will
begin by lining out the frameworks of typical ethics/power management prototypes or
“archetypes” he describes. Decision making patterns used by the specific prototypical
ethical actors’ approaches to ethical dilemmas are described. Then Robert Kegan’s
(1982) ideas about “evolving moral development” are drawn upon and parallels
between the specific ethical actors discretionary decisions and the frameworks of
ethical decision making he describes are underlined. A method o f application of these
frames o f reference within the “reflective practitioner” structure o f Donald Schon
(1983) will be described in order to enable social workers to recognize what kind of
processes may be occurring within themselves, their clients or their auspices when
decision making takes place in practice and research.
The decisions following on the recognition of the types o f potential ethical
decisionmaking, along with the elements o f the social influences outlined above, will
serve to help social workers make choices that are more informed and less “akratic” in
nature. Ideally, social workers decisions will come from reflective/reflexive position
that seeks to make choice to balance power in very possible situation. It may allow
social workers a better understanding o f the level o f ethical decision making the client
may feel stuck with as well as allowing for appropriate decision making when dealing
with auspices bureaucracy. We will then look to Kegan (1982, 1994) for some of the
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contexts that social workers and their clients are dealing with relative to the types of
decisions that must be made.

Reflexive Practitioners
The focus for reflective practice is rooted in the “deeper questioning of the
professionals’ claim to extraordinary knowledge in matters o f human importance”
(Schon, 1983; p. 5). Do social workers represent themselves as individuals who have
grappled with the types of conflicts over problems that populations served encounter?
Do we misuse this authority we claim to have through our professional position by the
kinds of ethical decisions we make regarding personal conduct, service availability, or
resource distribution? “Practitioners are frequently embroiled in conflicts of values” or
even over what constitutes a value (Schon, 1983; p. 17). Different perspectives on
values generate differing frameworks for generating meaning and these meaning
systems differences can result in specific communication problems; between parents
and children, partners and work peers (Kegan, 1993). These meaning systems
differences can result in differing perspectives about what constitutes moral/ethical
decision making (Bauman, 1993; Kegan, 1982, 1993; Nielson, 1996; Schon, 1983).
Here we begin with a look at Nielson’s description o f a typology o f different
perspectives on ethical decision making with a view toward social worker recognition
and reflection in the moment about the most effective way to meet each perspective
without compromising one's own moral/ethical position.
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Nielson ( 1996) delineates several “archetypes” of ethical decision making
processes. Nielson’s work provides a format for recognizing and overcoming obstacles
to ethical decision making within an organizational context which can be applied
productively to contexts social workers find themselves faced with. Regardless o f the
discipline, from anthropology to zoology, there is an organizational structure that
operates to ensure the viability of the discipline. Organizational dynamics, while not
alike within and between disciplines, are still populated by individual with agendae that
are expressed through differing levels of moral meaning making capacity. This capacity
is described by Kegan and Neilson’s framework serves to explicate the effects o f the
relative levels described.
Before looking further at Nielson’s work, we will explicate the development o f
Kegan’s (1994) four orders of consciousness that help us to set into context the ethical
frames o f reference to be developed below. Kegan, expanding on Jean Piaget’s work,
begins by describing the principle o f “elements” which become the foci of conscious
interest in first order consciousness. These elements are constrained to having qualities
contingent on the perceiving individual, usually a child psyche. He goes on to describe
the “durable category” which includes the “ability to construct a concrete world,
independent points o f view and a property bearing self’ (Kegan, 1994; p.23). This
ability allows it’s holder to differentiate one’s self from the selves o f others and allow
that these other selves to have certain “properties” that belong to them. The elements
from the first order of consciousness become the objects o f the consciousness o f the
second order. Kegan then describes the movement to the third order wherein durable
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categories “become an element o f [a] principle o f knowing rather than the principle of
knowing itself’ (p.26). This “cross-categorical” knowing takes a “reflective” view of
those things or individuals or thoughts that were previously durable categories. Each
successive category is a “new way o f making sense” (p.28) o f one’s environment; a
new way o f “organizing experience” (p.29). Finally the fourth order o f consciousness
takes into consideration that at the third order, individuals have developed structures of
values from and through which they live and interact with he world. As individuals, we
have developed certain ways of being within our relationships whatever their nature
(i.e. parent, partner or employee) and we are consistent in maintaining these aspects o f
our identity. This fourth order o f consciousness would “take values and ideals as the
object rather than the subject of our knowing” (p. 91); we develop “values about
values ’ (p.90). Kegan delineates four main points about these orders o f conscious
meaning making.
First, they are not merely principles for how one thinks but for how one
constructs experience more generally, including one’s think, feeling and social
relating....
Second, they are principles for the organization (the form or complexity) of
one’s thinking, feeling or social relating not the content [of the latter]...
Third, a principle o f mental organization has an inner logic, an “epistemologic .”
The root or “deep structure” of any principle o f mental organization is the
subject-object relationship ...
Fourth, the different principles o f mental organization are intimately related to
each other.. .the relation is transformative, qualitative, and incorporative... Each
successive principle subsumes or encompasses the prior principle. (Kegan,
1994; p p .33-34)
It has been necessary to go into more detail with Kegan’s work as it is the fundamental
structure within which the other frameworks must be integrated.
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A return now to Neilson’s “archetypes” or “evocative representational models”
(Nielson, 1996; p 10) is required. These archetypes set out the characteristics o f
unethical actors in the decision making interaction to be represented. Within Nielson’s
descriptions, the main archetypes are delineated and then several examples o f parallels
from historical corporate decision making follow. For the purposes o f this study,
discussion will be limited to brief descriptions of the archetypes alone. The
“Eichmaim” archetype represents an “upper-middle level” manager who facilitated the
“ administrative massacre’” o f millions of individuals through obedience to authority
that was expected and valued within the organization (the Nazi party) he was a part of.
“He obeyed orders without thinking o f ethical implications” (Nielson, 1996, p. 10). As
an ethical archetype his focus is narrowly constrained to what his job and needs are and
he does not even consider ethical implications. The “Richard HT’ archetype is said to
recognize the difference between right and wrong relative to an ethical frame of
reference but to act on the impulses for “personal gain” sloughing off the ethical
dimension. The next archetype is “Socrates’ Jailer” and his actions are taken with
some sense o f the ethical ramifications o f the act but while sidetracking the
responsibility the conflict onto the higher power who will punish him if he does not do
it’s bidding. This decision maker has a sense of the ethical dimension but also
considers other obligations (wife, family etc.) that would preclude his not being
obedient. The next is the “Phaedo” archetype who is consciously concerned with the
ethical dimensions o f things but does not seem to have a knack for ethical thinking or
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decisions except when his teacher Socrates is around (which cannot be constantly).
There is a tendency of the individual actor actualizing this archetype to allow unethical
behavior o f usually ethical others go unquestioned. Here, the issue o f conflict about
actions o f an otherwise likable person we e come into play. The “Faust” archetype
represents that actor who would make a decision which s/he knew was wrong because
the ends would be far better than the immediate harm that the decision would cause.
Another form o f this is making policy decisions that are the “lesser o f two evils”. The
big picture or goal obscures the reality of the immediate negative affects of the decision
made. The “Dr. Saguro” represents the next archetype. The actor here knows and
understands the ethical ramifications o f the proposed actions, is not under any coercive
pressure to act but decides that not to cooperate would be “impractical” given the
“corrupt” nature o f his environment and the need to please the government to whom
his decisions are subordinate (Nielson, 1996; p. 11-23). Each o f these archetypes
parallels in some ways qualities described by Kegan (1982) as representative o f specific
stages o f moral meaning making evolution. Each also represents specific organizational
decision making strategies as well as a specific “masks” the actor has donned in dealing
with his/her ethical reality (Bauman, 1993; P. 115).
How do social workers go about deciding in the moment which is the best
course o f action to adopt in dealing with situations involving variations on the above
described actors? Could we describe our own process to another (Schon, 1983; p.49)?
Neilson ( 1996) delineates the types o f decision-making techniques by which each o f
theses archetypal actors may be potentially addressed. He describes sbc types of
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discourse or dialog methods which are used by actors in decision making ; ( 1) “single
loop, win-lose forcing methods”, which entail an actor forcing accommodation to some
“ethical” program by threat o f punishment of the individual not concurring; (2) “single
loop, win-win” strategies, in which both parties to a negotiation come away with
something they see as desirable for themselves without conceding much ethically; (3)
“double-loop dialog methods,” which “retain much of the win-win method while
encouraging mutual ethical learning, mutual ethical belief conversion and mutual ethical
development” (Nielson, 1996; p.73); (4) “triple-loop dialog I,” otherwise known as
“friendly disentangling,” seeks, through one actor, to connect that actor with another
actor or group o f actors by identifying a common belief system or structure and help in
addressing a specific aspect o f that belief structure thought to be unethical; (5) “triple
loop dialog n,” a mode o f “upbuilding” process that seeks to adapt an extant “ethical
internal tradition in the context of a problematical environment” (Nielson, 1996;
p. 123); and (6) “triple-loop dialog III” which integrates postmodern thinking, such as
deconstruction, into a situation where participants are seen to be from very different or
even antithetical positions regarding ethics (Nielson, 1996; p .8). Each o f these
methods can reflect ways by which to understand a new “repertoire o f expectations [or]
images” (Schon, 1983; p. 60) o f these dynamics, adoptable by social workers. The
result can be widened practice wisdom with regard to how both clients and auspices
orient themselves to individual social workers and how we as social workers orient
ourselves to them.
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Whose Benefit? Evolving Moral Development
So what does a decision-making strategy which includes an awareness o f an
evolving moral development look like? Here an outline o f one decisional process that
could associate a moral/ethical framework with the decision making structure outlined
above is described and discussed. It can provide for social workers a method o f
“integrating or choosing among the values at stake in the situation” (Schon, 1983;
p.63). How these matrices are exercised (relative to some of the major life contexts
these decisions will have to be made within) by social workers and their clients is then
explored.
Kegan’s (1982) structure consists o f six stages o f consistently expanding frames
o f reference relative to what constitutes the field o f ethical choice making o f a given
individual. Beginning with the “incorporative self” the self goes through a process o f
“growth and loss” of, successively, the “impulsive,” the “imperial,” the “interpersonal,”
the “institutional,” and finally the “interindividual” selves. Each of these successively
wider “selves” represents a completely new frame of reference, a new order o f
consciousness which encompasses the previous one, about what constitutes “self’ for
the given individual and what constitutes the “other” to which this self is associated.
Each can represent a new or expanded sense of ethical awareness with the previous
frame o f ethical awareness as an object o f reflection. Each “pulls scattered bits of
information together” (Schon, 1983; p. 121) to reframe the previous stage o f
awareness. The “incorporative self’ is a “psychologic” based on an individuals sense of
need for holding by the environment; a need for the environment to take care o f felt
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entitlement. This would correspond loosely to the “single-loop, win-lose forcing
structure described above in the sense that one individual forcing others to see the issue
his/her way and generally regarded as a last ditch effort to force ethical behavior. The
“impulsive” self has recognized the “othef’-ness o f environmental objects, including
people and recognizes an other as other and valid in that otherness but still subordinate
to my needs. This would correspond roughly to the “single-loop, win-win structure.
Ethical decisions are relativized within a structure that still looks to satisfy some
unrereflective or often akratic need. The “imperial” self now recognizes the need to
deny the validity o f only focusing only on one’s own needs and demand that others
treat me as I know I should treat them’. Here, the Other becomes valid in their own
right and their perspective becomes commensurate with one’s own. This might be
adequately represented in the “double-loop” dialog method of ethical choice. The
“interpersonal” self will now resist the kind of fusion with others in one’s environment
in the form o f expectations about how these Others should act regarding one’s own
interests while still remaining in association with those Others. This perspective
attempts to find mutual location for consensuality while still arguing from a different
perspective. The “triple-loop I” methodology is the closest example o f this resolutions
strategy. The “institutional” self acknowledges the capacity for self definition with
regard to a valid external environment seeking definition through valuing some
personal idea of an environmental good. The “triple-loop IT’ method would
incorporate the mutuality considerations of the dialog process. The “interindividual”
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self has defined oneself and is engaged on the course of continuous redefinition of the
self s/he has evolved in the previous stages (Kegan, 1984). The “triple-loop III” dialog
method will be a loose approximation o f this category of ethical decision strategy.
Integrated as a strategy, these frameworks of approach to a reflective process
o f moral meaning making, or social construction, o f responses to ethical
decisionmaking can aid the social worker who takes it as their task to move in the
direction o f balancing social power imbalances that come about through discretionary
abuses o f authority in generating research and practice knowledge. The integration o f
these three frameworks can provide a possible method for social workers to apply for
their own process o f practice whether it be in applied or research oriented activity. The
provision o f more detail for these methods was required for the macro-and micro-level
applications to be more readily visible.
Social worker practitioners are involved in work that spans every level o f the
ecological system in implication if not in applied practice activity. It is necessary to
have a sense o f the elements o f the inter- and intrapersonal makeup of this multi-tiered
system within which this practice activity takes place in order to make the very best
possible decisions. A knowledge o f the public sphere and of the members o f this public
sphere can provide for a fuller intrapersonal grasp of the scope within which power
balancing in social work practice takes place. Having grasped this lager context,
potential ramifications o f practice decisions may be more fully appreciated. The
necessity to hold oneself accountable, and, as a social worker, to evolve through a
reflective, reflexive process, becomes clearer within this recognition o f scope.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Social power and knowledge construction are inextricably linked especially in
this contemporaiy’ historical period where the economic welfare of increasing numbers
of individuals is dependent on handling of information in some form or fashion
(Nussbaum & Sen. 1993). The ways that knowledge and social power are viewed are
in constant change (Walzer. 1993). In the field of social power, the previously overt
displays of individual whim manifested in power expression have given way slightly
to more covert operations of power abuse; at least to some extent in Western society.
This counts as a move in awareness no matter how slight. Traditional sources
previously counted as “unquestionable knowledge” are now in question as are the
ways that these traditions were perpetuated. The words used, as well as other aspects
of the construction of knowledge, are now under scrutiny to better understand how
they function within their contexts (Bordieu. 1991).
Social power has been abused since the beginning of recorded history. The
very first available social histories are documents detailing wars between disagreeing
factions of individuals. History, from some perspectives, is the documentation of
humanity’s learning and evolving from this learning. And yet the sometimes akratic
resistance to this learning is just as strong in some spheres as is the impetus towards it.
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The ethical systems o f thought, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, (who, it seems, are
still the beginning point for most contemporary ethical systems) attempted to answer
the justifications for abuses o f power with reasoned “discourse” in the communities of
public hearing.
This project has endeavored to continue this “answering” process vis-à-vis the
abuses o f power, however subtle, within the narrower sphere of social w ork practice.
This answering process has taken the form o f a critical exploration o f a particular social
artifact, knowledge, from a number o f different areas of academic interest. The
primary reasoning behind doing this is that there is, inscribed within the language of
these academic social artifacts, insight that would be helpful to the clientele o f social
work if they had access to it. T ogo into the reasons for this inaccessibility would
require a more complete history of social power abuse in general and would be outside
o f the scope o f this project but has been addressed in previous work (Hamilton &
Sharma, 1997). It is hoped that some o f these insights have been culled and translated
into a form that may be more accessible to use by clientele served by social workers.
Persons using and abusing social power take their precedents for their actions
from the information and other social artifacts available in the environment. Their
justifying rationale are frequently based on what is seen as “normal” in this
environment. Whether this framework is drawn from popular media, such as movies,
news, o r popular novels, or academic discourse within any field, there are tendencies o f
thought that are being expressed which have become part of the normative Zeitgeist. It
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is therefore necessary to look into the aspects of the Zeitgeist in order to bring to
clarity, or answer, all o f the sources o f possible justification.
Analyses o f the Zeitgeist currently take the form o f the modernity/
postmodemity debate. It has been necessary to survey the themes generated in this
debate in order to convey an understanding of how these themes underlie, at the most
basic level, themes o f interest in the other areas o f contemporary thinking. It is not
possible to generate a brief summary of the multitudinous variety of themes
characterizing this debate within the space of this conclusion that would do the debate
justice. Primarily, postmodemity has been concerned with correcting, what are, from
it’s perspective, injustices imposed by modernity. Modernity, in it’s own perspective,
had the same agenda regarding the period now identified as pre-modemity. Given that
the debate is still current, thinkers in other fields o f thought, expressed in any o f the
media outlined above, may be couching their expressions in the language o f those
themes.
Social workers are affected by this level of the debate sometimes directly, when
the professedly modem or postmodem view is brought to bear on a given social issue,
but social workers are also affected when research or practice requires utilization o f
information to be drawn from other academic fields. These fields have knowledge
bases generated by individuals who may be adherents o f either (or both, or neither) side
o f this modernity/ postmodemity debate. When the social worker can become familiar
with the currents o f this debate as it expresses the Zeitgeist, more informed choices can
be made with regard to issues o f power abuse as they may surface in practice decisions.
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While the modemity/postmodemity debate and the effects it has on other
academic disciplines have expressed the macroeconomic level o f concern to social
workers, the meso- and microeconomic levels are more in focus when attention shifts
to social power and the workings o f social power. Since social power functions
through frequently invisible forms and media, it has been necessary to make these forms
and media more visible. This has entailed going into an extended discussion about
forms that the abuse o f power operate through, the authority and discretion, and about
the media abuses o f power operate through, the margin and marginality. A number o f
ways that social workers come to be faced with power abuses are delineated with the
intent o f providing individual social workers with the knowledge to answer these
abuses when encountered.
Social construction is discussed as one o f those modes through which power
abuses become manifest in sources o f information used by social workers in practice.
Social construction, first described in the early 60’s, is now recognized as a more
accurate perspective on knowledge construction than the paradigm of the “objective”
scientific observer. From this perspective it becomes clear that the previously idealized
objectivity o f the positivist research paradigm has been partially a self-deception and
when carried to the extreme of dogmatic ideological positioning, an abuse of power in
and o f itself. Social constructions o f a narrow range o f themes are traced through the
specific disciplines chosen to represent social works communication community to
underline how these constructions might affect social workers utilizing materials from
these disciplines to generate social work practice knowledge.
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The activity o f taking a critical step back from the subject o f interest enables
postmodemity now (and modernity previously) to see and analyze the workings o f
thought as it is expressed in the media society uses to represent the Zeitgeist. In
seeking to provide an answer to the activity of power abuse a similar stepping back can
be productive for social workers. This process is identified in this project as the
reflexive practitioner perspective and combines the methodology o f reflective action
from a small group of theorists to propose an integrated framework of reflexive
practice for use by the social worker in everyday practice situations. Drawn from
organizational, developmental and ethical frameworks, this model can be utilized to
assist the individual social worker in making decisions that answer power abuses in the
immediate practice situation.
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